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How do Development Organisations Integrate Climate and Conflict Risks?

Experiences and Lessons Learnt from the UK, Germany and the Netherlands

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Preface

The security implications of climate change have attracted increased attention in policy and research during the past decade. Since climate change has far reaching implications on human livelihoods and activities, the potential security implications are broad and complex. As stated in the fifth assessment report from the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), climate change undermines human security, affects some previously known violent conflict triggers, and increasingly shapes conditions of security and national security policies. Overall, this means that climate change entails different types of security challenges stretching from human security to state security, which require responses from different policy communities – foreign affairs, defence, crisis management, finance, environment and development. These communities are currently in different stages of developing strategies for integrating climate security risks in their work.

This report was produced within a project funded by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The main goal of the project was to assist and inform policy making on security risks posed by climate change, with the focus on two specific areas. How policy organisations such as development and defence actors frame and integrate climate security risks in their work; and how and under what circumstances climate change increases the risk of violent conflict. The first topic was examined through a review of the literature and two separate case studies on how organisations integrate climate security risks in their work. The organisations concerned were the European External Action Service (EEAS) and development organisations in three European countries. The second topic was examined through a review on the climate-conflict literature in one specific region, East Africa. All three studies are described in separate reports published in 2016. A synthesising report will be released in September 2016.

The present report addresses the integration of climate and conflict risks in development organisations' work. The three organisations examined are Department for International Development (DFID) in UK, the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) in Germany and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Two forms of integration are in focus: climate resilient peace building and conflict-sensitive climate change

programming. The overall goal of this study was to learn from experiences made regarding the implementation of what is known as "integrated approaches". Interviews with staff at the organisations were a substantial basis for the analysis.

The report was produced by the Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, in collaboration with Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Ui). During the work with this report, we had fruitful discussions and received valuable comments from professor Fredrik Uggla at the Institute of Latin American Studies, Stockholm University, who acted as a reviewer on an earlier draft, and from the project group consisting of Sebastian van Baalen, Niklas Bremberg, Karin Bäckstrand, Lisa Maria Dellmuth and Hannes Sonnsjö. We would also like to express our gratitude to the Swedish MFA who made this study possible. A warm and sincere thanks also goes to all of you who took your time and shared your thoughts and experiences. Without your contribution this report could not be made.

Malin Mobjörk, project leader and senior researcher at SIPRI



Stockholm, April 2016

Executive summary

There is growing consensus among practitioners and scholars that combined climate, conflict and fragility risks require integrated approaches. Development organisations have recently started to integrate security implications of climate change into high-level policies. However, the translation of high-level policies into geographical strategies and programming has often proven a challenge for development organisations. In this report, we explore the questions of *how development organisations have addressed combined climate and conflict risks in their policies* and *how they have dealt with challenges to implementing these policies in their programmes.* We do so by examining policies, analytical tools, strategies and implementation procedures in three development organisations in combination with interviews with staff at the organisations. The organisations concerned are the Department for International Development (DFID), the Die Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). More specifically, we focus on two forms of integration that have been identified as particularly relevant for effectively addressing combined climate and conflict risks: the integration of climate risks in peacebuilding efforts and the need to apply a conflict-sensitive approach in climate change programmes. This is often discussed in the literature in terms of *climate-resilient peacebuilding* and *conflict-sensitive climate programming*.

The overall aim with this study was to contribute to an increased understanding of how institutions could deal with the policy challenges posed by combined climate and conflict risks. While there are some previous studies addressing such policy responses at the regional and global level, there is to our knowledge no other study that investigates how national development organisations have dealt with these issues. By examining both the policy responses and the implementation strategies of the three organisations, the study provides a deepened understanding of the opportunities and challenges of translating these policies into practice. The ambition was to enhance knowledge of different policies and of factors affecting implementation. This knowledge is essential for policy makers to accurately assess the value of current Swedish strategies in this regard and to identify how internal organisation and procedures could be improved to better respond to compound climate and conflict risks.

As mentioned above, the report examines two forms of integration of climate and conflict risks: climate-resilient peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive climate programming. The core element of *climate-resilient peacebuilding* is the importance of taking both short- and long-term climate risks into consideration in peacebuilding efforts as potential drivers of conflict. The report shows that in high-level policies in both Germany and the UK, climate

change is considered a factor that could increase the potential for conflicts. Despite this, neither country requires climate change and climate variability to be specifically addressed in conflict analysis, early warning systems or country strategies. The primary strategy for integrating climate risks into peacebuilding activities is through climate-proofing. Climate-proofing is, however, based on the "do no harm" logic and therefore requires complementary integration strategies in order to contribute positively to peacebuilding processes. The most important consequence of disregarding climate risks in conflict analysis is that conflict prevention could be hampered.

The overarching goal with *conflict-resilient climate programming* is that responses to climate change should not increase the risk of conflict, and in the best case even help strengthen peacebuilding processes. Several studies therefore suggest that in order to address combined climate and conflict risks, it is necessary for climate change programming to take conflict risks into account. Resilience and vulnerability are the most common frameworks that development organisations use for their climate-related activities. Resilience and vulnerability methods are intended to identify risks and strengthen adaptation and development planning. While the methodologies of both DFID and GIZ include socio-economic conditions, in particular vulnerability assessments pay little attention to the conflict dimension. Without integrating conflict risks into their assessments, development organisations are unlikely to be able to address combined conflict and climate risks in a consistent manner.

Besides the importance of including careful analysis of the conflict dimension in resilience and vulnerability assessments, there is also a related debate regarding the risk of maladaptation. Simply put, the argument goes that if climate programmes are not conflict-sensitive, they could themselves have negative impacts on land tenure and marginalise certain groups, with negative impacts on their propensity for conflict. In both GIZ and DFID, there are guidelines regarding how to ensure the conflict sensitivity of development programming in conflict-affected and fragile states. While these procedures are very important, staff members reported that they often need to balance many different priorities. Hence, without support from help desks or expert groups, it could be challenging for staff members to employ these tools and develop entirely conflict-sensitive projects.

The report clearly shows that the translation of high-level policies into strategies and programming has proven challenging for development organisations. Lack of knowledge and internal organisational structures and priorities are important obstacles to effective implementation. An important question is how implementation could be improved. The report identifies a number of lessons for policy makers and practitioners:

- There is a need for *improving coordination* across policy areas. Climate and security threats span various policy areas that are in many cases strongly separated. If these policy areas are managed within the same department or by a specially created new steering group, coordination becomes significantly easier. The report also shows that external expert units could play an important coordinating role and contribute to coherence and sustainability over time.
- *Knowledge* about how climate change may affect food, water, migration and humanitarian disasters is crucial for responding effectively to climate-induced security risk. Our analysis shows that development organisations often lack the knowledge needed to respond efficiently to combined climate and conflict risks. It is therefore important to create help desks or specialist units, internal or external, that provide expertise on these matters.
- There is a need to *modify existing methodological tools*. In most organisations climate programming and peacebuilding efforts are largely dealt with using separate analytical tools that are unlikely to be able to capture how complex risks interact with each other. It is therefore important to develop new analytical tools that can address both conflict risks and climate change vulnerability.
- While *mainstreaming* has the advantage of raising the awareness of an issue, this strategy also has clear limitations. Besides requiring time, capabilities and commitment by staff, mainstreaming strategies often follow a "do no harm" logic, which means that they only ensure that proposed projects have no obvious negative impacts on e.g. climate change. Mainstreaming does not necessarily contribute to more profound forms of integration where positive effects are achieved. Hence, mainstreaming strategies by themselves are not sufficient to effectively address combined climate and conflict risks and need to be complemented by other integration strategies.

Keywords: climate change, human security, development organisations, policy implementation, integrated approaches.

Contents

Abbreviations

BMUB	Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (Germany)
BMZ	Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development
BSO	Building Stability Overseas
BRACED	Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters programme
CHASE	Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (DFID)
CEA	Climate and Environment Appraisal
CSSF	Conflict, Security and Stability Fund (UK)
DFID	Department for International Development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
GIZ	Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (The German Society for International Cooperation)
HERR	Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
JACS	Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOD	Ministry of Defence (UK)
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
REDD	Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

1. Introduction

Research has established that climate change will have far-reaching implications for both human and state security (Adger et al. 2014:758). Climate change can cause changes in precipitation patterns, rising temperatures, melting glaciers, natural disasters and sea level rise. These biophysical processes are, in turn, likely to increase competition over water, land and food, increase the risk of natural disasters, cause forced migration and, possibly, trigger violent conflicts. Research has also shown that climate change constitutes a particular threat in fragile and conflict-affected states. Countries with a history of violence generally have a weaker capacity to adapt to climate change, and low adaptability heightens the vulnerability of their populations to climate impacts. While places such as Somalia, Haiti, Congo and Sierra Leone are perhaps the most obvious examples of such countries, the problem goes further than that and today an estimated 1.4 million people live in states that are both conflict-affected and fragile[1] (Matthew 2014:84; Scheffran et al. 2012:79). Unless climate change is dealt with effectively in such settings, it could constitute a significant threat to future sustainable development and undermine peace-building processes (Matthew & Hammill 2012:268).

At the same time, there are several examples of mitigation and adaptation programmes that have actually exacerbated insecurity over land tenure, marginalisation of minority groups and social tensions (Tänzler, 2013:29). Several researchers have therefore argued that the responses to climate change need to be conflict-sensitive (Rüttinger et al. 2015:64; Babcicky 2013; Barnett & O'Neil 2010). Climate and conflict risks are intrinsically linked and therefore require integrated responses by the actors involved. The question is how such integration can be achieved in practice.

The combined task of responding to climate and conflict risks demands multiple tiers of action – from the household to the international level – and effective coordination between different policy areas (Vivekananda et al. 2014:495). Yet such demands involve a huge challenge for development organisations to implement in practice. First of all, development organisations are complex entities in which planning, assessment and decisions are often widely diffused. They also work in settings in which

[1] http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/new-deal/about-new-deal, accessed 8 March 2016.

information to guide assessments and decisions is often lacking. Finally, development cooperation, particularly as performed by bilateral organisations, requires a high degree of coordination, harmonisation and – ultimately – negotiation with a range of other actors at local and national level, many of which may have their own agendas and preferences that do not necessarily concur with those of the development organisation itself.

This study examines how different development organisations address the combination of climate and conflict risks in their policies and investigates how these organisations deal with challenges to implementing those policies in their programmes. While such integration is undoubtedly required in most fields of development cooperation, this report addresses two forms of integration that have been identified in the literature as particularly relevant for effectively addressing combined climate and conflict risks; the integration of climate risks in peace-building efforts and the need to apply a conflict-sensitive approach in climate change programmes. This is what is often called *climate-resilient peace building* and *conflict-sensitive climate change programming* (Crawford et al. 2015:1; Vivekananda et al. 2014:495; Dabelko et al. 2013).

The importance of taking into account factors related to natural resources in conflict prevention and resolution is well established among practitioners (UNEP 2015; Young & Goldman 2015), and development organisations have in recent years started to integrate the security implications of climate change into high-level policies. As the Dutch foreign minister recently remarked: "Climate change has a major impact on our security. We can no longer approach these two topics separately."[2] However, the translation of high-level policies into geographical strategies and programming has often proven a challenge for development organisations. For instance, several analysts have suggested that the strong separation between disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and mitigation, development and conflict constitutes an important obstacle to effective implementation of policies in this regard (Rüttinger et al. 2015; Crawford et al. 2015; Peters & Vivekanada 2014). Even within a particular organisation these policy areas are often separated, which could make it difficult to coordinate analytical tools and activities. Other analysts suggest that lack of information regarding the more concrete impacts of climate change in different countries prevents policy makers from responding to climate risks (Lewis & Lenton 2015:384). Other important factors obstructing integration are related to internal organisational structures and priorities.

[2]https://www.government.nl/topics/climate-change/news/2015/11/02/koenders-and-ploumen-'climate-change-and-security-are-intimately-linked', accessed 17 November 2015

This report is based on an analysis of policies, analytical tools, strategies and implementation procedures in three development organisations: the British Department for International Development (DFID), the German Die Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). These organisations represent countries that have in different ways distinguished themselves by pushing the climate and security agenda forward in the international debate: The UK and Germany have requested debates on the topic in the United Nations Security Council and put pressure on EU to address the issue, while the Netherlands has more recently launched an annual conference on the subject and has long experience of working with conflict prevention and resolution in relation to transboundary water. There is thus a high-level commitment in these three countries and there is strong reason to believe that this commitment is reflected in their development strategies and programmes. However, while these countries could be regarded as leaders in this policy area, the integration of climate risks is a relatively new field, which means that the organisations themselves are also in the process of developing and assessing the value of different approaches and strategies. Hence, this report analyses what are in most cases incipient attempts at addressing this issue rather than established and well-proven strategies. Even so, there are important lessons to be learnt from the experiences of these organisations.

The empirical material used for this analysis consisted of formal policies, strategies and 24 semi-structured interviews.[3] In order to capture the potential problems that may obstruct effective implementation, integration was analysed at the following three levels: (1) High-level thematic policies; (2) geographical tools and strategies; and (3) implementation procedures.[4] To address the first level the most important thematic policies were reviewed, while for the second level the most important assessments tools and operational plans (such as conflict and climate vulnerability assessments and geographical strategies) were reviewed. While thematic policies offer a general idea of strategic objectives and visions, assessment tools and geographical strategies are closer to concrete practice and programming. In some cases there was restricted access to certain documents (conflict analysis and country strategies), and in those cases it was necessary to rely on interviews to a greater degree than initially planned. Finally, to address the third level and cover factors affecting implementation, procedures such as climate and conflict proofing that must be observed by every project were analysed. In order to identify other factors such as access to information,

[3] See list of interviews at the end of the report for an overview of the types of informants interviewed for this study.

[4] A limitation of the present analysis is that it does not systematically review programmes and projects, which would have offered a more complete picture of implementation of the policies within the organisations. Such an analysis was beyond the scope of this study.

follow-up procedures and priorities within the organisation that may affect implementation of policy, interviews were conducted with staff members in the three countries. These included employees in the foreign office, development ministries and organisations whose work is focused on peace and conflict and climate change.

This study aims to contribute to the debate on how institutions could deal with the policy challenges posed by combined climate and conflict risks. While there are some previous studies addressing such policy responses at the regional (Youngs 2015) and global level (Hall 2016), there is to our knowledge no other study that investigates how national development organisations have dealt with these issues. By examining both the policy responses and the implementation strategies of three organisations, it was possible to obtain a deeper understanding of the opportunities and challenges to translating these policies into practice. The ambition was to enhance knowledge of different policies and of the factors affecting implementation. This knowledge is essential for the ability of policy makers to assess the value of current Swedish strategies in this regard and to identify how internal organisation and procedures could be improved to better respond to compound risks.

The report is organised in the following way. Following this introduction, Section 2 introduces relevant debates about climate-resilient peace building, conflict-sensitive climate change programming and policy implementation, and explains how these concepts are employed in empirical analysis of the three cases. Sections 3 and 4 discuss climate and conflict policies and implementation strategies in the British and German development cooperation. These sections first describe key policies and then discuss how they have been integrated at different levels in the organisation, with the focus on specific problems that may prevent or delay policy integration within DFID and GIZ. Section 5 discusses the case of the Netherlands, which began to address this issue relatively recently, and is therefore somewhat briefer than Sections 3 and 4. It primarily focuses upon on-going discussions within the Dutch MFA regarding different opportunities and challenges for integrating this issue within existing policies and programmes. Section 6 completes the analysis by comparing the cases and discussing the particular implementation problems identified. Finally, a numbers of lessons for Swedish practitioners and policy makers are presented.

2. Implementation of climate fragility policies in the work of development organisations

As discussed above, there is broad agreement in the literature regarding the need to respond to the combined climate and conflict risks through integrated approaches. While climate-induced security risks require responses and integration at multiple levels and between different policy areas, this study primarily focuses upon two forms of integration: climate-resilient peace building and conflict-sensitive climate change programming. Some development organisations have started to integrate climate and conflict risks in their high-level policies and strategies. However, there is a need to know more about how these concepts could be put into practice and implemented in the work of development organisations in a context of fragility. This section first discusses the current understanding of climate-resilient peace building and conflict-sensitive climate change programming. Thereafter, the following three factors that affect the implementation of policies are discussed: organisational structures and procedures, prioritisation and access to information. Finally, two common methods for integration of policy areas are discussed: facilitation of coordination between different policy areas and mainstreaming strategies.

2.1 Climate-resilient peace building

Climate-resilient peace building mostly involves taking short- and long-term climate risks into consideration in peace-building efforts, either as potential drivers of conflict or as factors that may increase vulnerability to conflict (Crawford et al. 2015:1, see also Matthew & Hammill 2013; Matthew 2013). Conflict scholars largely agree that increased stress on livelihoods and unequal distribution of resources could constitute drivers of conflict if local communities lack the capacity to adapt to those changes (Buhaug 2015:272; Barnett 2003:10; Nordås & Gleditsch 2007:634). Hence, to prevent the emergence of new tensions or the intensification of on-going conflicts, it is important to work proactively with assessing potential risks and adopt the necessary mitigation and/or adaptation measures. For development actors involved in the construction of peace, this means that they must start to pay

attention to climate risks in their work and consider how could this be achieved in practice.

Crawford et al. (2015:11) outline six principles for integrating climate risks into peace-building activities, namely: (1) Use integrated context analysis as the foundation for planning, (2) balance immediate and long-term priorities, (3) address climate-natural resource-conflict linkages, (4) facilitate coordination across disciplines, sectors and levels, (5) adopt a forward-looking approach to planning, and (6) aim for resilience as an overarching objective.

While these principles are of a relatively general nature, the core message is that climate risks need to be integrated into analytical tools and that planning for conflict prevention and coordination between policy areas needs to be facilitated. For instance, climate risks could be integrated into general procedures for risk assessment and early warning systems, thereby enabling identification of escalating risks for disasters, scarcity of water and food at an early stage, which under some conditions could trigger migration and social conflicts, and formulation of plans to avoid these. Conversely, conflict considerations must be integrated into climate change activities.

2.2 Conflict-sensitive climate change programming

Conflict-sensitive climate change programming means that responses to climate change should not increase the risk of conflict and in the best case even help strengthen peace-building processes (Crawford et. al. 2015:1; Babcicky 2013:486). In this context, there is an ongoing debate regarding the risk of maladaptation. Simply put, the argument goes that if climate programmes are not conflict-sensitive, they could in themselves have negative impacts and create insecurity over land tenure, marginalisation of minority groups, increased environmental degradation and loss of biodiversity (Rüttinger et al. 2015:64; Tänzler 2013:29). If so, livelihood insecurities, competition over natural resources and conflict propensity could increase as a consequence of well-intentioned policies (see also Barnett & O'Neil 2010). There are multiple examples of mitigation projects (primarily REDD+) that have triggered local tensions, as well as adaptation efforts that have not taken the local context into account and reinforced the power of local elites. The minimum standard should therefore be to have procedures and clear guidelines in place to ensure that climate change activities are made conflict-sensitive.

However, to ensure that climate change programmes contribute to peace building in a more positive sense, one could argue that conflict proofing at project level is not enough and that a more overarching approach is required.

This is provided for instance by the resilience framework that has been adopted by many organisations. However, some authors suggest that existing resilience methodologies are primarily designed to address disaster risks or external shocks, and are less suitable for addressing conflict. This is because rather than just 'bouncing back' from [external] shocks or stresses, sustainable peace requires some kind of transformation of internal conflict structures (McCandles & Simpson 2015:14). Hence, in order to address combined climate and conflict risks, careful analysis and transformation of conflict structures needs to be included by existing resilience assessment tools. One of the tasks in the present empirical analysis was therefore to try to analyse how resilience methodologies in the three case organisations address and include conflict analysis.

In sum, climate-resilient peace building suggests that it is important to integrate climate risks into peacebuilding efforts, while conflict-sensitive climate change programming suggests that it is important to integrate a conflict-sensitive approach into climate change programmes. However, it appears to be difficult to implement these processes in development strategies and programming.

2.3 Implementing integrated approaches

The policy study literature demonstrates that policy implementation is far from a top-down administrative process. As various scholars (e.g. Wilson 1991; Lipsky 1980) have shown, policies are often negotiated and modified by staff members during the implementation process. There are a number of factors that could pose problems and obstacles to effective implementation of a policy. Analysis of the literature indicates that the following categories of potential problems are particularly important: (1) Unclear policy objectives; (2) having various actors involved in policy implementation; (3) organisational values and interests; (4) relative autonomy of the implementing actors and (5) access to information.[5]

Unclear policy objectives are discussed for instance in Lipsky's (1980) work on street-level bureaucrats. He shows how staff members often have discretionary power and room for making their own interpretations. As Barrett (2004:255) explains, while some policies (for example health and safety) require strict compliance, others permit greater scope for innovation within the limits of certain procedural rules. In development organisations, work pressure on staff members is often high and there are a number of requirements from head office and demands from a range of other actors at local and national level, who may have their own agendas. In this context,

[5]The first four factors are taken from Barrett (2004:252).

personnel are likely to invent different strategies to cope with uncertainties and high work pressure, which may reduce the likelihood of a policy being implemented as intended.

Having various actors involved in policy implementation often leads to difficulties in communicating and coordinating actions (Barrett 2004:252). For instance, it is very important to establish which actor has the ultimate responsibility and decision-making authority. It is also difficult to achieve coordination between various actors or organisational units whose work is thematically distant. The topic dealt with in this report requires units within development organisations that are tasked with peace-building work to coordinate their efforts with units working on climate change. However, these units normally have little experience of coordinating their work.

Organisational values and interests may also create problems with different policy interpretations and priorities, which affects implementation. As several studies have shown, policy change often requires organisational and cultural changes, and until a policy can be implemented in the 'normal' way of doing things, the status quo is likely to remain (Barrett 2004:256). For instance, peace-building units often focus upon large-scale political conflicts and are therefore less likely to take into account the more low-intensive, communal conflicts that researchers foresee emerging as a consequence of climate change and variability. It is particularly important to create commitment among staff members, for instance through training courses or internal campaigns, when changes in their normal ways of doing things are required.

Relative autonomy of the implementing actors could make it difficult to follow up whether policies are implemented. Mechanisms for follow-up and monitoring of results could then be important to ensure compliance. In development co-operation, the implementing actors are often other organisations and in some cases sovereign states, which means that there is very little control over implementation. Even so, there are internal procedures in relation to different assessments and evaluations that need to be implemented by staff members within the organisation.

Access to information is an important dimension for addressing climate and conflict risks. Staff members need information and capacity to engage in analysis of compound risks. Various researchers point to the lack of reliable policy-relevant information regarding the impacts of climate change on local livelihoods, disaster and conflict risks (Lewis & Lenton 2015:387; Ide & Scheffran 2014:266-267; Birkmann & Teichman 2010). Without useful information, it is difficult for policy makers and staff members to act upon climate and security risks. Development organisations could for instance create external or internal help desks, and in that way support staff members.

Summing up, there are a number of problems that need to be overcome in order to integrate climate and conflict considerations in the work of development organisations. To resolve these problems, policy objectives must be clear, coordination between policy areas must be strengthened, staff members need information and there should be some kind of follow-up mechanism.

There are two concrete strategies that development organisations could use when faced with the constraints listed above in order to strengthen integration of one perspective into another. These are: facilitation of coordination between policy areas and mainstreaming.

2.3.1 Facilitation of coordination between policy areas

An important obstacle to effectively responding to climate-induced security challenges is that it requires coordination and information from largely separate policy areas and implementing actors. These actors have their own organisational structures and cultures, which affects how they interpret and implement policy. Researchers have therefore suggested that staff members from different communities such as conflict, climate change, development and disaster risk management need to come together to share their knowledge, develop joint risk analysis and coordinate their actions (see for instance Crawford et al. 2015:7). Creating steering groups or delegating the responsibility to public policy consultancies are ways of achieving this. Most important, however, is to create forums where staff members from different communities could meet and share experiences and develop joint analysis and coordination.

2.3.2 Climate- and conflict-proofing development programmes

Within organisations, mainstreaming is often used for ensuring that a policy which is essential for an organisation is integrated into analytical tools and programming. Mainstreaming strategies mean that the responsibility for implementing the policy is spread out to the entire organisation. An alternative implementation strategy would be to delegate the authority for the policy to an expert unit with specially trained people who have implementation of this policy as their sole responsibility. The expert unit can still be present and serve as an advisory role to other entities, but without being responsible for the implementing the policy (Uggla 2007:10). In an evaluation of Sida's mainstreaming policies, Uggla identified three requirements for effective implementation. First, all staff members need to have the necessary capabilities for making informed considerations. Second, all personnel must be committed to adapting to the requirements of the policy; capabilities could be increased through training and help desks, while

internal campaigns could enhance staff commitment. Third, it is also important to create some kind of administrative control through procedures for follow-up and oversight (Uggla 2007:10-11). However, even if these requirements are met, some of the obstacles discussed above could prevent effective implementation. For instance, if the policy is unclear or unfeasible or if staff members are overloaded with work and different priorities, they are less likely to give sufficient attention to mainstreaming procedures.

The following sections draw on the discussions above to analyse how DFID, GIZ and the Dutch MFA work with integration of climate and conflict risks.

3. Responses of UK development organisations to climate-induced security risks

The UK addressed the security implications of climate change early on. The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) have taken an important role in shaping a discourse that is heavily orientated towards national security threats, while the Department for International Development (DFID) has made efforts to mainstream climate risks in peace-building efforts and has also tried to work in an integrated manner with risk management through resilience methodologies. The present analysis examines how DFID's thematic policies have been translated into analytical tools and geographical strategies. The purpose is to identify potential obstacles that explain the existing disconnection between policies and other tools and procedures closer to the implementation of programmes and projects. As background, a brief introduction to how the climate and security debate emerged in the UK is first presented.

3.1 Emergence of the climate and security debate in the UK

In the early 2000s, the British Foreign and the Commonwealth Office (FCO) and MoD started to take an interest in how climate change could affect national security. As described by by an informant who formeraly was employed at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the framing of climate change in terms of a security threat was initially a strategy on the part of FCO to enter into conversation with conservative climate change deniers in the US.[6] However, continued engagement by FCO has meant that today climate change is frequently referred to as a significant threat in key security strategies (HM Government 2015a). In the UK's National Security Strategy from 2015, there is for instance a section in which climate change is described as "one of the biggest long-term challenges for the future of our planet. It leads to and exacerbates instability overseas, including through resource stresses, migration, impact on trade, and global and economic food insecurity." (HM Government 2015b:66). This quote clearly illustrates how

[6]Interview former employe at Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK, 24 February 2016.

climate risks are perceived as an issue that needs to be addressed in national security strategies.

An early initiative to discuss climate risks in a conventional security context took place in 2007, when FCO took the initiative for the very first debate within the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) on climate change from a perspective of global peace and security. Two years later, in 2009, UNSC followed up the meeting by adopting a resolution – Climate Change and its possible Security Implications (UNSC 2009a) and the Secretary General of the United Nations wrote a report with the same name (UNGA 2009b).[7] The British FCO, in coalition with primarily Germany and France, has also played an influential role in addressing the issue within the European Union (EU) and the G7 group. The FCO has also commissioned several reports that have focused on assessment of climate risks from a perspective of national security, but also of economics (see for instance Garman & Fox Carney 2016; King et al. 2015; PWC 2013). This connection to national security and economics could possibly explain why climate change has been given so much attention in the British political debate during some periods.

Another important explanation for the UK's engagement in climate change and security risks is the political leadership, which has led to increased prioritisation within FCO and DFID during certain periods. As mentioned before, political prioritisation could mean that the organisation contributes additional resources and offers support for ensuring implementation of a policy. Andrew Mitchell was the Secretary of State for International Development between 2010 and 2012 and played an important role for the higher prioritisation of climate change within different areas of DFID's work during these years. DFID's Business Plan 2011-2015 contained a commitment to make programmes more climate smart (DFID 2011d), and in 2012 the so-called "future fit" initiative was introduced to develop and strategy for DFID's response to the challenges and opportunities that climate change poses for development. More concretely, the International Climate Fund (ICF) was created in 2010.[8] In addition, the number of climate advisors was significantly increased, from 10 to 75-80, which meant that 10% of advisors were then focusing on climate change.[9] Together, this constituted a broader cadre of staff with knowledge of climate change and greater interest in developing approaches that involve integration of climate change considerations in development programming within DFID. However, as

[7]In 2013, the UK, together with Pakistan, requested anew that climate and security should be addressed at a so-called Arria-formula meeting, a very informal, confidential meeting within UNSC.

[8]Through the ICP fund, GB£3.8 billion were invested over a period of five years.

[9]Interview with employee at the Profession of Environment and Climate change at DFID, UK, 6 January 2016.

elaborated upon below, this does not necessarily mean that climate risks have been integrated in peace-building efforts.

3.2 Climate-resilient peacebuilding

Contributing to peace and stability in conflict-affected and fragile states has become an important strategic priority for DFID in recent years (DFID & HM Treasury 2015:7). In terms of organisational structures, it is also important to mention that DFID's work in the area of peace and conflict has increasingly become integrated with that of FCO and MoD during the past decade. These ministries have together developed joint assessment tools, organisational structures and funding instruments. While this is in line with recommendations for development and foreign policies actors to work in a more integrated manner, it is important to analyse how climate risks have been integrated in this work. Below the integration of climate risks at the three main levels identified for analysis in this report (i.e. high-level policies, analytical tools and geographical strategies and implementation procedures) is discussed.

3.2.1 Integration of climate risks in DFID's peace and security policies

In the Building Stability Overseas (BSO) strategy, which was published in 2011, DFID together with FCO and MoD presented an integrated cross-sectoral approach for conflict prevention and outlined a strategy for integrating development programmes with diplomatic efforts and defence engagements. In the BSO strategy, climate change is mentioned incidentally as a factor that "may increase the potential for conflict over disputed land and water" (DFID et al. 2011:10). While climate risks are mentioned, they are not a prioritised topic in the strategy. In DFID's paper Building Peaceful States and Societies, which describes DFID's strategy in fragile and conflict-affected states, even less attention is given to climate risks. That paper emphasises the importance of addressing the underlying causes and effects of conflict and fragility, but climate risks are not explicitly mentioned as one of the factors that could trigger conflict and fragility (2010a:14). Hence, although climate risks are mentioned in the BSO, they are clearly not given any priority in other policy documents. This is certainly surprising, given the sustained engagement by FCO and MOD on the topic.

3.2.2 Integration of climate risks in conflict assessments and operational plans

To examine whether the BSO's identification of climate risks as a potential trigger of competition for natural resources is reflected in conflict assessments and geographical strategies, it is first necessary to describe two important changes in term of organisational coordination between the three ministries that at least hypothetically could allow increased integration of climate and conflict considerations. The first important change in terms of coordination across policy areas was the creation of the so-called Stabilisation Unit, which promotes collaboration between these three departments to coordinate their work in fragile and conflict-affected states. This work is primarily directed towards large-scale, violent conflicts. The second change was the creation of a cross-departmental conflict analysis methodology, known as Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS), which is intended to guide interventions in conflict-affected and fragile states. JACS is still on a relatively general and overarching level and is specified in operational plans developed for each country. While DFID developed the preceding methodology on its own, JACS was developed in collaboration between DFID, FCO and MoD. This kind of coordination across policy areas and integrated conflict analysis is actually in line with Crawford et al.'s (2015:11) recommendations for ensuring climate-resilient peace building. However, it is also necessary to examine the kinds of advisors (conflict and/or climate) represented in the Stabilisation Unit and what the formal requirements are regarding the integration of climate risks.

As regards the competence on climate change available within the Stabilisation Unit, at the highest level of representation of the three ministries climate risks are not included as an explicit area of work. Moreover, the units that represent the three ministries are more focused on conventional, large-scale conflicts. For instance, DFID is represented by the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE), which primarily concentrates on on-going, large-scale conflicts. This is important, as various conflict scholars (e.g. Van Baalen & Mobjörk 2016; Buhaug 2015:272; Barnett 2003:10; Nordås & Gleditsch 2007:634) have demonstrated that it is primarily these kinds of low-intensity conflicts that are likely to emerge as a consequence of climate change and variability. Moreover, CHASE has just one climate advisor,[10] which is likely to be insufficient for systematically analyse climate risks. Finally, there are no climate advisors among the analysts and staff members responsible for daily work in the Stabilisation Unit.[11] Under these circumstances, the capabilities and commitment among staff members to address climate risks seem to be very limited.

[10]Interview with employee at CHASE, DFID, UK, 23 December 2016.
[11]Group interview with a cross-government team involved in the JACS, UK, 7 January 2016.

The lack of focus on climate risks is also reflected in the JACS. For instance, there is no formal requirement to include climate risks in JACS (CSSF 2016). However, in some cases the group responsible for JACS has on its own initiative included climate risks among the other conflict-triggering factors. In one such case of a JACS in 2015, concerning the Sahel region, climate change was identified as one of six factors that drive conflict and instability in the region. According to the Unit's report on the Sahel region, climate change constitutes a threat multiplier by for instance exacerbating the problem of chronic food insecurity and creating heat stress.[12] In an interview with the the cross-government team involved in the JACS for the Sahel region, the members explained that even though there is no requirement on taking climate change into account in the JACS, they decided to include climate risks after having distributed an early draft among experts on the Sahel region. They followed expert advice and included climate advisors in the group that developed the report.[13] However, group members also reported that they were interested in integrating climate risks, but that there was a lack of information on these risks and of practical guidelines on how to integrate them. These examples clearly illustrate the importance of bringing in new perspectives in assessments and ensuring that conflict teams are provided with information on climate risks.

The inclusion of climate risks in JACS is important for several reasons. First, it opens the way to identifying conflict risks that could affect the UK's strategic prioritisation and programming. Various informants suggested that there is currently a focus on on-going conflicts and large-scale security threats, which makes it difficult to address less acute and long-term issues such as climate change. They emphasised the importance of methodological tools that could capture how climate risks might affect countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar where there is no on-going large-scale conflict, but more low-intensity forms of insecurity and instability. For certain, one could easily envisage that identifying and addressing climate risks at an early stage is crucial for avoiding human insecurities and escalating social tensions that could be politically exploited. As some informants emphasised, in on-going conflicts such as in Syria, it is already too late to act upon climate risks, even though it might be important to take into account how climate change and variability affect the country in a post-conflict process.[14] Based on available evidence, it can therefore be concluded that addressing

[12] As the JACS are classified as 'official sensitive' I did not have access to the document, but informants described the content in interviews. Interview with an employee at CHASE, DFID, UK, 23 December 2016.
[13] Group interview with a cross-government team involved in the JACS, UK, 7 January 2016.
[14] Interview with an employee at CHASE, DFID, UK, 23 December 2016. Interview with an employee at GIZ, Germany, 23 March 2016.

climate risks in JACS is one possible means to work in a more preventative way in countries where there is no on-going conflict or humanitarian crisis.

Second, if climate risks are identified as a security threat in JACS, this also opens the way for funding for projects that address climate change from the Conflict Security and Stability Fund (CSSF), which is a relatively important funding instrument. Otherwise, climate change projects would have to be funded from climate funds earmarked for climate change adaptation or resilience, which, as discussed below, generally lack a focus on conflict prevention and resolution. However, an informant at DFID, who contributed climate expertise to the JACS for the Sahel region, argues that including climate risks in the JACS is not enough to guarantee that the analysis will be translated into concrete projects on the ground. This would require people working in the country offices to formulate project calls in which climate risks are included as a component. How project calls are formulated is important within DFID, as it is difficult to propose a project that falls outside the criteria of a call. One important problem that the same informant also mentioned is that climate advisors are in general rarely hired in fragile and conflict-affected states where other short-term and more urgent problems tend to overload programme officers.[15] Two other informants confirmed that in conflict-affected societies in general, short-term goals relating to on-going conflicts and the protection of civilians often need to be prioritised.[16] This view was confirmed by the informants within the cross-government team involved in the JACS in the Sahel, who argued that even though climate-related environmental change constitutes a significant threat in the specific case of the Sahel region, it is outside the priority of their work. In their view, the CSSF funding for the Sahel region is limited and must be focused on urgent issues such as peace building, conflict reduction and border security.[17] They also suggest that climate change is already funded elsewhere. Hence, even though climate risks are included in conflict analysis, they are not necessarily addressed in an integrated way. In the subsequent phases, staff members often feel the pressure to prioritise short-term, pressing issues. Moreover, there is often a lack of capability to make assessments on potential links between climate and conflict risk at the level of implementation of programmes.

Another important type of strategy document is the so-called operational plans, a type of country strategy that DFID develops and updates each year. While JACS guides more overarching strategic policies and prioritisations, operational plans are closer to activities on the ground, as progress in

[15] Interview employee at CHASE, DFID, UK, 23 December 2015.
[16] Interview with an employee at CHASE, DFID, UK, 23 December 2015, Group interview with a cross-government team involved in the JACS, UK, 7 January 2016.
[17] Group interview with a cross-government team involved in the JACS, UK, 7 January 2016.

relation to development objectives is measured against these plans. In the guidelines for operational plans, there is a formal requirement to describe how interventions are 'climate smart' and contribute to delivering low carbon climate resilient growth" (DFID 2010e). However, there is no requirement to examine climate change from a conflict perspective.

As with JACS, in some operational plans climate-related risks have been identified as a driver of insecurity. For instance, the operational plan for Sudan describes how DFID has created a new Environmental Governance and Conflict Mitigation Programme for addressing "natural resource conflicts and help poor people cope with the effects of climate change" (2014:6). In a similar vein, the operational plan for Bangladesh suggests that it is necessary to address climate change in order to contribute to security and prosperity (2014:6). In contrast, in the operational plan for Kenya climate risks are mentioned, but without connection to conflict risks, while climate risks are hardly given any attention at all in the operational plan for Mali, which is surprising given the magnitude of climate-related risks in that country. Hence, while there are no formal requirements to take climate risks into account in JACS and operational plans, these analytical tools are intended to identify underlying causes of conflict and the people responsible for developing these reports have included the climate risks aspect on their own initiative in some cases. The integration of climate risks is thus to large extent dependent upon the assessment of the individual analyst. Climate risks are obviously not relevant in all contexts and by introducing climate risks in general assessments such JACS, an important tool is created for identifying when further attention needs to be paid to these risks.

3.2.3 Implementation level –mandatory screening

At the implementation level of projects and programmes, two pivotal questions arise: What are the formal requirements for taking climate change into account in the development of peace and conflict programmes? What are the potential problems in implementing these procedures and instruments? Already in 2006, DFID expressed a commitment to developing guidance with the multi-lateral development banks by 2008 to screen all development investments for the effects of climate change (DFID 2006:59). The most important instrument for integrating climate change is the so-called Climate and Environment Appraisal (CEA) process, a kind of mainstreaming strategy introduced in 2010. The CEA made it mandatory for all DFID projects to include an assessment of the potential climate risks and opportunities (DFID 2012:3). In that sense, it has similarities to the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure, with the difference that climate risks are included.

The CEA was a relatively ambitious screening instrument for ensuring that climate risks were integrated into programming. Each programme had to be revised and approved by a special unit of climate and environmental advisors. Programmes were categorised according the degree of their climate risks and a statement was made on whether further monitoring was required during the life cycle of the project (DFID 2012:1). An employee at DFID, believes that the screening helped generate awareness of the importance of climate and environment risks and opportunities within DFID. However, as he argues:

> Only on a few occasions have they taken that [the climate risks] forward in an analysis that said, "what does that mean for your agricultural or industrial production or whatever?". So the risk has been identified but you have not necessarily taken the following analytical steps and said "what should therefore change in order to address those risks?".[18]

His assessment is confirmed by an evaluation of the identification of climate risks in DFID's project documentation in three countries, which found that climate risks are recognised in 88% of projects, but that some additional action in relation to managing the expected climate-related risks to projects in the future is included in only 30% of projects (Ranger et al. 2014:476). This is an important finding, but it is also crucial to ask *why* staff members do not integrate climate risks even when they have been identified within the CEA process. One informant at DFID suggested that the problem is that there is no follow-up mechanism for ensuring that the identified climate risks are addressed in programme activities. As he puts it:

> No one really asks the question "okay, you're conflict advisor, but how have you mainstreamed climate into your programme?". I have never seen that. It's about the incentives, you have to get the incentives right. There are no real incentives for individuals to do it otherwise.[19]

Hence, the CEA process has raised the awareness about climate risks, but these risks have only been integrated at a superficial level in programming. While lack of follow-up and oversight seem to be an important explanation behind this, one could also speculate about other factors that could hamper further integration. For instance, the DFID could perhaps have worked more actively with increasing the knowledge and commitment of staff members by providing training courses and internal campaigns, or the climate and

[18]Interview with employee at the Profession of Environment and Climate change at DFID, UK, 6 January 2016.
[19] Interview with employee at CHASE, DFID, UK, 23 December, 2015.

environmental advisors could perhaps have offered staff members even more support in programme development.

In 2014, the CEA screening process was withdrawn within DFID. An employee at DFID argues that the most important reason was that the mandatory screening required very much time and resources and that even in cases where it was obvious that climate impacts were not relevant, it was necessary to go through the process.[20] This is undoubtedly a reasonable argument, as development organisations need to address multiple urgent issues. However, other informants suggested that the reason for the withdrawal was the lack of prioritisation of climate change within the current Conservative government.[21] Based on these contradictory statements, it is difficult to determine what might be the real underlying reasons for the withdrawal.

Instead of the CEA, DFID today employs a form of technical guidelines, the so-called smart rules, which require that a general risk assessment is conducted. The guidelines for the risk assessment make no specific reference to climate change. However, it can be noted that it continues to be mandatory to take gender equality into account in all programmes (rules 7 & 8, DFID 2016a:11). An employee at DFID argues that climate change should be taken into account only when it is relevant, which would mean that resources could be used more efficiently.[22] At the same time, one could easily envisage climate risks being overlooked, since there is nothing to guarantee that climate risks are considered in the initial analysis. This is reinforced by the well-known experience that long-term challenges are easily are overlooked or downplayed (Crawford et al. 2015:11).

To conclude, even though there is increased coordination of policies and organisational structures between UK departments engaged in conflict and security, this does not necessarily mean that the perspective on potential causes of conflicts has been broadened to include climate risks. While climate change is identified as a potential driver of conflict in high-level policy documents such as the BSO report, there is currently no formal requirement to take climate risks into account in conflict analysis, operational plans and programme development. Still, it appears as though the former mandatory screening raised awareness of climate risks within the different parts of the organisations, and there are various examples of

[20] Interview with employee at the Profession of Environment and Climate change at DFID, UK, 6 January 2016.

[21] Interview with employee at the CHASE, DFID, UK, 23 December, 2015. Still, just before the climate summit in Paris, the UK government committed itself to increase its climate funding by 50% for the five coming years, to GB£5.8 billion (DFID 2015:19).

[22] Interview with employee at the Profession of Environment and Climate change at DFID, UK, 6 January 2016.

voluntary initiatives to take climate risks into account. However, the analysis also suggests that follow-up or oversight mechanisms are important for guaranteeing that identified risks are translated into programming.

3.3 Conflict sensitivity of DFID's resilience work

Having examined how climate risks are integrated in peace-building efforts, we can now look more closely at how the conflict dimension has been integrated in DFID climate change programming. DFID has to a large extent addressed climate change through resilience policies and methodologies. Under the resilience framework, DFID has tried to integrate different thematic areas such as climate change, humanitarian aid and poverty reduction and, to some extent, conflict. DFID departs from a common understanding of resilience, which defines resilience as "the ability of systems, countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standard in the face of shocks or stresses such as earthquakes, weather extremes or violent conflict – without compromising their long-term prospects" (DFID 2016b). Violent conflict is thus included in DFID's understanding of resilience. However, as discussed above, resilience methodologies were initially designed to address disaster risks or external shocks, and to less extent to address conflicts (McCandles & Simpson 2015:14). It is therefore interesting to investigate how conflict sensitivity is addressed in DFID's resilience policies.

3.3.1 Resilience policies within DFID

An important starting point for the increased attention to resilience within DFID was the publication of the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) in 2011. Resilience was one of seven themes[23] that HERR identified as crucial for improving humanitarian aid in fragile and conflict-affected states. In general terms, HERR envisions integration of climate change, disaster risk management, poverty reduction and conflict under the framework of resilience. In the government's response to HERR, the importance of adopting the necessary changes for putting resilience into practice as a central part of DFID's development work was emphasised (DFID & UKAID 2011a:8). Furthermore, the same document was embedding disaster resilience building first in a number of priority countries,[24] and by 2015 in all DFID country programmes. However, there are no more concrete proposals concerning the implementation of this process, which makes it difficult to evaluate the progress.

[23]The others were anticipation, resilience, leadership, innovation, accountability and impact, partnership and humanitarian space.

[24]In the first round Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Bangladesh and Nepal, and then Pakistan, Niger, Chad, South Sudan, Zimbabwe and Myanmar (DFID & UKAID 2011a:9).

In the UK Government's Humanitarian Policy, *Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience* (DFID & UKAID 2011b), "build resilience to disasters and conflict" is one of seven policy goals, which suggests that DFID is seeking to develop a joint framework for dealing with climate and conflict risks. The Humanitarian Policy also explains how resilience could be achieved in different contexts. In conflict settings the importance of strengthening political structures at the community level is emphasised, as well as the need to conduct strategic conflict analysis in order to improve conflict sensitivity (DFID & UKAID 2011b:10).

In a DFID approach paper on disaster risk management, it is emphasised that the resilience approach holds the promise of improving the coordination between different policy areas, and in particular between development and humanitarian work (DFID 2011c). This document also states that the climate change team has advanced the most in adopting the resilience approach, while it is acknowledged that conflict prevention is an area where the resilience framework has been less well developed within DFID (DFID 2011c). This is in line with recent theoretical debates regarding the difficulty in applying existing resilience frameworks to conflicts.

3.3.2 Resilience methodologies within DFID

Within DFID, both the climate and the humanitarian teams have played important roles in development of resilience methodologies. While the Climate Department has concentrated on risk management and decision-making under uncertainty, the Humanitarian Department has focused on planning for and reacting to disasters. In a similar way as, for instance, the World Bank and OECD/DAC, DFID departs from an understanding of resilience as a strategy for understanding risks and risk management (DFID 2016b:1). Even though resilience has been a prioritised topic since 2011 and DFID has put much effort into embedding resilience within the organisation, but the complexity and context sensitivity of resilience makes it still a bit unclear how it should be implemented. In 2015, the Climate and Environment department, was therefore given the responsibility to further operationalise DFID's approach to resilience. One informant at this department argues that one of the problems with resilience is that it is so complex that resilience is sometimes not very helpful in practice. In his view, it is therefore important for DFID "to find out what that [resilience] actually means in practice" and how resilience policies and practices could be put together in a coherent way in order to build resilience to identified threats.[25] As well known in the literature, unfeasible and unclear policies can pose considerable problems for effective implementation and they allow

[25]Interview with employee at the Climate and Environment department, 6 January 2016.

staff members to interpret and implement the policy content in ways that were not necessarily intended by policy makers, which could lead to lack of coherence.

The efforts to concretise the concept resulted in an understanding that resilience is intended to "enable people to anticipate, avoid, adapt and respond to crises" (DFID 2016b:1). 'Anticipate' refers to insurances for catastrophe risks and efforts to increase the understanding of risks, for instance of droughts. 'Avoid' refers to investments in infrastructure or projects that will reduce the effects of the shocks. Examples of such investments and projects are employment in activities for preserving the soil, forest governance or infrastructure for facilitating rapid urbanisation processes. 'Adapt' refers to activities to improve the ability of societies to cope with the impacts of climate extremes and disasters, while 'respond' refers to humanitarian aid in disaster situations (DFID 2016b:1).

This way of operationalising resilience clearly links climate, disaster risk reduction and humanitarian aid, but there is a notable absence of references to the conflict dimension. This interpretation is confirmed by Brooks et al. (2014:5), who argue that DFID's resilience framework is primarily focused on identifying external hazards that could have adverse consequences on a system.

One explanation can be found at an overarching conceptual level. Resilience has primarily been used for analysing a society's ability to recover from external shocks, and this focus on external factors could potentially make resilience difficult to apply to conflicts. Conflicts are of a different character, as they are internalised in the social structures and therefore require some kind of transformative change of existing conflict structures (McCandless & Simpson 2015). This requires careful analysis of conflict structures and dynamics, which then need to be included as parts of the resilience analysis. McCandless and Simpson (2015) underline the importance of careful reflection upon how resilience methodologies could be adapted to more comprehensive forms of risks analysis. At the same time, if the framework becomes too broad and complex, it will be difficult for staff members to apply. There is thus a difficult balance to be struck between making a framework sufficiently comprehensive and making it useful as a tool for staff members.

3.3.3 Implementation of the resilience framework in conflict-affected and fragile societies

As described above, DFID's overarching resilience framework focuses on identifying external hazards. At the same time, when country officers are

developing programmes in conflict-affected and fragile societies, there are a number of principles and guidelines that they need to follow in order to avoid doing harm. DFID follows OECD-DACs Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations and has produced a number of briefing papers that support country offices in the development of conflict-sensitive programmes. One prominent message in these briefing papers is the importance of conflict analysis and sensitivity. Careful monitoring of conflict dynamics and how development programmes affect those dynamics is emphasised as critically important, and there are several methodologies for conducting these assessments in fragile and conflict-affected societies (DFID 2002; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d). These guidelines can be regarded as a sort of mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity, in order to avoid doing harm. However, avoiding doing harm is not the same as developing programmes that are designed to address combined climate and conflict risks.

However, as an informant at the Climate and Environment department points out, it would make sense to put more emphasis on fragility and conflict within the resilience framework ahead, as DFID's work is increasingly concentrated to those areas. He argues:

> Many things drive conflict: climate and access to resources or lack of access to resources that climate change may have created is one of them. But it is unlikely to be the only one. Therefore I think it is important to think in terms of resilience about those risks. How they are combined together in a sensitive way."[26]

This quote raises fundamental questions regarding how to modify the resilience framework and risk analysis in order to improve the way in which compound risks are addressed. Development of joint methodologies that capture these risks has yet to be seen, in particular in concrete programming. The so-called Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters programme (BRACED) is according to one informant at DFID an attempt at developing a new way of operationalising the resilience framework.[27] The programme is implemented in 13 countries in South and Southeast Asia and in the African Sahel region, and involves an investment of GB£110 million. As the name of the programme suggests, the focus is on strengthening the resilience to climate extremes and improve the coordination between disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation into

[26]Interview with employee at Climate and Environment department, DFID, UK, 6 January 2016.

[27] Interview with employee at Climate and Environment department, DFID, UK, 6 January 2016.

development approaches (www.braced.org). Even though one programme explicitly addresses conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in the light of changing migration pattern in the Sahel-region, the conflict dimension does not seem to be a key priority in the BRACED programme. BRACED could still be interpreted as an effort to integrate policy areas through the resilience framework.

Summing up, even though the resilience policies opened the way for integration of conflict dimensions in climate change programming, it seems like the resilience methodologies and programming still need to improve how complex challenges related to conflict and fragility risks are addressed. The most important challenge identified is the complexity of resilience and informants argued that introducing even more dimensions would make it more difficult to apply.

This chapter demonstrated that DFID has taken some steps in recent years to address combined climate and conflict risks. However, this ambition is primarily reflected in high-level policies, and less in analytical tools, geographical strategies and implementation strategies. The analysis showed that methodological tools and programmes for addressing conflicts are still separated from efforts to build resilience against disaster risks. This means that, at least until recently, climate risks were primarily dealt with as a mainstreaming issue, but without necessarily affecting the orientation of peace and conflict programmes. In a similar way, in the resilience framework there are supporting methodologies for making projects conflict-sensitive, but conflict considerations are not yet fully integrated within the resilience framework, which is also reflected in programming. Hence, on stepping down a level from overarching thematic policies, peace and conflict methods and programmes still do not address climate risks systematically. The resilience framework is, however, an important step in the right direction of addressing complex risks in an integrated manner.

The lack of prioritisation within DFID seems to be an important explanation, with various important implications for the possibility to integrate these issues efficiently. First, there are no climate advisors in the Stabilisation Unit and very few conflict advisors in the Climate and Environment Department, which means that these perspectives are less likely to be present in project planning and monitoring. Second, there seem to be few follow-up mechanisms, which means that staff members have few incentives to put effort into integrating new perspectives in assessment tools and strategies. Finally, a short-term time horizon and lack of information on how climate risks may affect conflict propensity seems to be an important factor preventing staff members from integrating climate risks in peace-building efforts.

4. Responses of German development organisations to climate-induced security risks

Germany was also early in addressing the security implications of climate change. In Germany, the Foreign Office, Federal Environment Ministry and Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, together with the think tank adelphi, have during different periods played important roles in addressing the issue at international and national level. The implementing agency for the German development cooperation, GIZ, has also made efforts to operationalise the linkage between climate and security and put it into practice in development programming, primarily through mainstreaming strategies.

This chapter examines GIZ's policies for peace building and climate change, as well as how these policies are translated into different analytical tools and mainstreaming strategies. It also reflects upon potential obstacles related to prioritisation, internal organisational structures, access to information and mechanisms for follow-up and oversight. The section is organised as follows: A brief introduction to how the climate and security debate emerged in Germany is presented, followed by discussions on how climate risks have been integrated in peace-building efforts and how conflict sensitivity has been integrated within GIZ's work on climate and disaster resilience.

4.1 Emergence of climate and security policies in Germany

In Germany the climate and security debate goes back to the mid-1990s, when the Federal Environment Ministry tried to put the environmental drivers behind insecurity and conflict on the agenda of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the EU. In the 2000s, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) also commissioned several reports on the topic (GTZ & BMZ 2008; FCO 2007). It was primarily after Frank-Walter Steinmeyer became foreign minister in 2005 that the Foreign Office started to address the topic. However, the

Federal Ministry of Defence has not taken a prominent role.[28] Hence in Germany, climate and security policies have been developed by environmental, developmental and foreign policy departments within government rather than by the military side, which is an important difference from the British case.

After the failed climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009, the German MFA tried to find a strategy for re-establishing the negotiation process. In its view, the security discourse was sufficiently compelling to generate interest from high-level policy makers and heads of the state.[29] An employee at the German MFA described how they tried to put the topic on the international agenda during this period in different ways, the most important step being by requesting a debate on the topic in UNSC. Germany justified the request by referring to food security and sea-level rise and the threat of human insecurity (UNSC 2011:4). In addition, the MFA approached regional and international organisations such as OECD, OSCE, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU with the aim of putting climate and security on the agenda of these organisations.

In order to realise these efforts of international outreach in a sustained and coherent manner, the MFA commissioned the German think tank Adelphi to support this work. Moreover, Germany used its G7 presidency to commission the report *A New Climate for Peace*. Currently, Germany is leading an internal process within G7 whereby different countries have been asked to come up with proposals regarding how they will implement the recommendations of the report.[30]

At the same time as the Foreign Office was endeavouring to put climate change and security on the international agenda, it also sought to deepen awareness of this issue within Germany institutions. This work was again conducted with the support of adelphi, which organised educational conferences, training courses at embassies and internal campaigns (MFA & adelphi 2014). In one informant's view, the combined effect of all these activities is that climate change is generally accepted as an important issue for the Foreign Office.[31] It is important to acknowledge adelphi's role as an expert unit in this process. As one informant at the MFA puts it:

> Without adelphi we would not have been able to do this work because we couldn't just employ people in the Foreign Office.

[28]Interview with employee at adelphi, Germany, 11 January 2016.
[29]Interview with employee at the MFA, Germany, 25 January 2016.
[30]Interview with employee at the MFA, Germany 12 January 2016.
[31] Interview with employee at the MFA, Germany, 25 January 2016.

> They brought in a lot of previous expertise and many networks, and I think they have also been crucial by often reacting extremely rapidly to our requests. We used to ask: 'Can't we do this? Can't we try that?' And so on. They were always very flexible and gave us good groundwork for whatever we were trying to do. Without them it would not have been possible.[32]

Adelphi thus functions as an expert unit that continuously offers advice not only to the MFA, but also to BMZ and GIZ. Over the years, BMZ and GIZ have commissioned several reports from adelphi on identifying how the topic could be operationalised within the development cooperation. Adelphi's role as an expert unit to different German institutions is most likely an important explanation for the relatively coherent and sustained efforts to address the topic, in particular within the MFA. However, adelphi's effort to put the topic on the agenda, during some periods with the strong support of policy makers, does not necessarily mean that climate and security has been a main priority that has been effectively translated into analytical tools and programming within GIZ. This becomes evident when looking more closely at how climate risks have been integrated in peace-building efforts and how conflict sensitivity has been integrated in climate change programming.

4.2 Climate-resilient peace building

Since a majority of the countries in which GIZ works are affected by conflict, fragility and violence, it is important to support the strengthening of state building and peace building in these countries (BMZ 2013). In doing so, BMZ and GIZ work with an early warning and conflict analysis tool that is implemented at different levels and phases of development programming. An important organisational aspect is that within GIZ, peace, security and disaster risk reduction are located within the same unit (Governance, Crisis Management, Construction), which provides a pathway for strengthening coordination of these policies and programmes. At the same time, the Climate Change unit is separate and also responds to a separate unit with BMZ. As shown below, this internal organisational structure is important in explaining how climate risks are addressed in peace-building efforts.

[32] Interview with employee at the MFA, Germany, 25 January 2016.

4.2.1 Integration of climate risks in peace and conflict policies

In the strategy for peace and security from 2013, the linkage between climate change and conflict is clearly outlined. Even though it is not a key topic, climate change is described as one of the factors that may "trigger and perpetuate fragility and violence" (BMZ 2013:12). It is also claimed that integrated approaches, which combine different instruments and address relevant issues such as climate, environment and gender equality are most effective. As disaster risk reduction is located within the same unit, it is also relevant to examine how the link is described in the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) strategy (BMZ 2015a). In the DRR strategy, strengthening resilience is a prominent theme, since natural disasters are increasingly caused by climate change. This link made between DRR and climate resilience is hardly surprising, but an interesting aspect of the DRR strategy is that the linkage between climate and conflict is spelled out explicitly:

> The consequence of extreme weather events can have a negative impact on weak institutions or violent conflict and reinforce the spiral of violence. Extreme weather events can trigger migration, lead to a loss of already accumulated peace dividends, or fuel competition over scarce resources and thus, exacerbate fragile situations (BMZ 2015a:13).

It is suggested that in addressing these challenges it is essential to integrate climate change adaptation with DRR activities (2015:10). This is emphasised, as effective management of disaster holds the promise of contributing to prevention of crisis and conflicts in fragile and violence-afflicted states. Then at least on a high-level policy level, GIZ's disaster-resilience framework encompasses the conflict dimension. Hence, the linkage between climate change adaptation, disaster risk and conflict is present in both the DRR and the peace and security strategy, even though somewhat more explicitly in the DRR strategy.

There has certainly been interest from both BMZ and GIZ regarding how the unit can operationalise the link between disaster risk management and peace-building efforts. In 2015, BMZ organised a series of workshops focusing on how DRR and peacebuilding efforts could be integrated more closely. One of the informants reported participating in several workshops that focused on the connections between DRR and conflict. More specifically, the workshops discussed how disaster risks affect fragility and how fragility of conflict affects vulnerability to disaster risks. The purpose of the workshops was to formulate a number of recommendations on how to address cross-cutting challenges coherently and effectively. As this is an on-going and internal process, it has not resulted in any concrete recommendations.

However, the informant reported that resilience came up in several discussions as a potentially unifying approach.[33]

This is interesting, as resilience methodologies not necessarily integrate the conflict dimension. However, an important factor, which could potentially facilitate the integration of conflict and resilience frameworks in the case of GIZ, is that DRR and peace building are located within the same department. This illustrates the importance of internal organisational structure and close coordination for integrating one policy area into another. However, while the linkage is emphasised in high-level policies and the organisational structure provides the opportunity to integrate climate risks, it is still necessary to examine to what extent these policy goals are reflected in analytical tools and geographical strategies and if not, to try to identify why.

4.2.2 Conflict assessments

The peace and security strategy has identified climate risks as a potential trigger of fragility and violence but these need to be included in conflict assessments. Germany has a relatively advanced system of assessing the conflict potential in all partner countries. Since the late 1990s, BMZ has used its own early warning system, with a set of indicators that should make the ministry aware of any risk of conflict.[34] If there is such a risk, a country is given a red or yellow label depending upon the degree of risk of escalating conflict. For all countries that are defined as conflict countries, it is mandatory to conduct a peace and conflict assessment, and to include peace building into country strategies and development programmes. However, as Rüttinger et al. explain, the indicators of the early warning system are related to political economics, which means that environmental or climate risks are rarely taken into account (Rüttinger and Carius 2013, cit. Rüttinger et al. 2015:90). Hence, in the first stages when the early warning system operates, it is not mandatory to include climate risks. This is also the case with peace and conflict assessments (GIZ 2013:16). One informant working with peace-building processes argues that it is notable that climate risks have not been included in peace and conflict assessments.[35]

The peace and conflict assessments are currently divided into four different phases (BMZ et al. 2016). At the most general level, a context analysis is conducted in order to identify the most important factors that reinforce conflict, fragility and violence, and to map key actors. As an informant who works with peace building at GIZ describes, if climate impacts were

[33]Interview with an employee at GIZ, Germany, 11 December, 2015.
[34]http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/issues/Peace/crisis_prevention/index.html [accessed 28 March 2016]
[35]Interview with an employee at GIZ, Germany, 23 March 2016.

obviously related to a conflict they would probably be included in the analysis. However, she argues that the links are often not so obvious and takes Syria as an example.[36] Another informant[37] cites lack of knowledge as an important factor. This lack of knowledge could to some extent be counteracted by including climate advisors in the process, or by creating help desks that could offer support.

The next step, after conducting the context analysis, is to identify the more specific changes required for strengthening peaceful and inclusive development.[38] This phase also assesses whether the development cooperation addresses the themes that are most important for overcoming conflict, fragility and violence. However, if environmental or climate risks are not identified in previous stages as suggested by Rüttinger et al. (2015), it is unlikely that they will be identified at this stage, as context analysis is used as a point of departure for such analysis.

The third step is related to the identification of risks to development cooperation, both in general and at the project level, while the fourth step is related to the impacts of projects themselves, the so-called 'do no harm' principle. This principle is discussed in more detail below in the section on conflict-sensitive climate change programming.

Hence, one could thereby conclude that to work in a more integrated way with climate and conflict risks, one important first step would be to include climate indicators in peace and conflict assessments. Taking these risks into account is important, as it not only enables development actors to work in a preventative way with conflicts, but also increases the likelihood that these risks will be taken into account in country strategies and development programmes. However, this would require BMZ and GIZ to make this issue a priority and invest resources in the development of the early warning system and the peace and conflict assessments.

4.2.3 Implementation level – climate proofing of peace-building projects

Implementation of projects and programme is associated with some formal requirements for taking climate risks into account in the development of peace and conflict programmes. The most important instrument is the

[36]Interview with employee at GIZ, Germany, 23 March, 2016.
[37]Interview with employee at GIZ, Germany, 11 December 2016.
[38]Three questions guide the analysis: 1) What specifically needs to be changed in order to overcome conflict, fragility and violence? 2) What areas of activity should take priority for peaceful and inclusive development? 3) At which levels should the first steps be taken (local, regional, national or international)? (BMZ et al. 2016).

mainstreaming of climate change into all development projects within GIZ, including peace and conflict projects. In 2011, GIZ introduced the so-called Climate Proofing for Development, which in fact has many similarities with the CEA screening process that DFID formerly applied, but withdrew it in 2014. The Climate Proofing process has two main elements: systematic analysis of climate-related risks and opportunities and identification of adequate adaptation measures. The Climate Proofing methodology is relatively well elaborated and is divided into four steps. First, information on climate trends is gathered, while in a second step meetings and workshops are held in order to identify biophysical and socio-economic impacts of climate change on different groups. Third, stakeholders and experts develop adaptation measures, and fourth, these measures are integrated into planning documents (GIZ 2013). These are standard procedures that all projects need to go through.

The Climate Proofing system can be considered a relatively sophisticated and rigorous system. Several informants reported that climate proofing is prioritised issue, as is reflected for instance in the resources invested in ensuring the proper implementation. GIZ has established a relatively large team of climate advisors and also has a separate climate help desk. Several informants emphasised the importance of the help desk,[39] as "it is relatively easy to get support for climate-proofing peace building projects".[40] Another informant in the Climate Change Adaptation unit said that the help desks have been important for ensuring a common approach. He also pointed out that GIZ has worked actively to strengthen the commitment among staff by specifying the relevance of climate risks for each sector and country. In his view, this is an indicator of the high-level support for climate proofing within GIZ.[41] It is well known that prioritisation is crucial for making mainstreaming strategies work properly. However, the system also has clear disadvantages, as several informants suggested that mainstreaming policies exert a heavy burden in the process of developing a new project.[42] As an employee at GIZ, puts it:

> The burden and the expectations are extremely high and adding more expectations, or even raising the benchmark or the

[39] Interview with employee at the climate change department at GIZ, Germany, 9 February 2016.
[40] Interview with employee at GIZ, Germany, 23 March, 2016.
[41] Interview with employee at the climate change department at GIZ, Germany, 19 February 2016.
[42] Interview with employee at the climate change department at GIZ, Germany, 9 February 2016. Interview with employee at the climate change department at GIZ, Germany, 19 February 2016. The latter also said that GIZ has received criticism from the internal audit administration of the German government about the process of developing new programmes being too complex

> expectations in terms of these different mainstreaming topics, is not feasible.

In a similar vein, an external analyst argued "the tools that GIZ are using for the programmes are, I would say, too complicated and too complex. You have to make heavy investments in order to work that through."[43]

This shows that GIZ has made climate proofing a priority and has invested resources in ensuring implementation. However, the system also puts high demands on staff and it is therefore important to consider how one priority could be weighed against another in order to focus on the most relevant problems in each context.

Another important aspect to bear in mind is that climate proofing as it is designed can only ensure that the "do no harm" principle is followed. There is no requirement for peace-building programmes to be modified in order to contribute in a positive way to combined climate and conflict risks. To do so, it would be necessary to change the way questions are asked. In the view of an informant at the MFA, it would be important for GIZ to integrate climate risks in order to better address the underlying causes of conflict and instability.[44] Other informants working with peace building also confirmed that in general, little attention was given to climate risks within peace and security programming. According to one informant, an important explanation for this lies in the internal organisational structure:

> Part of the problem is that there is a structural division between climate change and conflict within GIZ. No-one is working on it [combined climate and conflict risks]. It is a cross-sectoral issue that we do not look at in-depth, but rather from the side.[45]

To conclude, in a similar way as in DFID, in GIZ climate change is identified as a potentially important driver of conflict in high-level policy documents. However, it is still not mandatory to take climate risks into account in different types of conflict analysis, which is also reflected in the fact that there are very few projects that address issues at the interface of climate change, natural resources and conflict. Still, it seems as though climate-proofing has improved the procedures for reducing the negative impacts of peace-building programmes on climate change. One important potential explanation for this disconnection between high-level policies and implementation is the internal organisational structure. To address issues that

[43]Interview with employee at adelphi, Germany, 22 February, 2016.
[44] Interview with former employee at the MFA, Germany, 25 January, 2016.
[45]Interview with an employee at GIZ, Germany, 11 December, 2015.

are at the interface of different units, it is necessary to create new forms of coordination between the climate change unit and the peace and conflict unit. Unless there is top-level prioritisation within the organisation, such coordination is unlikely to take place. Another important aspect is the knowledge gap regarding the link between climate change and conflict, which makes it difficult for policy makers to translate policies into concrete analytical tools and strategies.

4.3 Conflict-sensitive climate change programming

In 2014, Germany topped the list of donors to climate change-related development funding.[46] Germany transfers these funds primarily (81%) through bilateral cooperation in nearly 50 countries. The funds are invested in mitigation and adaptation projects and in protection of biodiversity through REDD+ programmes.[47] The following sections look more closely at how conflict risks are integrated in GIZ climate change policies and analytical tools such as vulnerability assessments.

4.3.1 GIZ climate programming and debates about the link to migration

GIZ has a Climate Change unit that is responsible for implementing programmes related to mitigation and adaptation. However, even though the mandate for these issue-areas are located in different units. The DRR team is located within the same unit as the peace and conflict team. Against this background, it is interesting to note the difference between how the Climate Change and DRR units have addressed the linkage between climate change and risk of conflict. While DRR policy puts emphasis on the links between climate change, disaster and violent conflicts, there are no such references to conflict in climate change documents. Here it should be noted that GIZ has no official climate change policy, but a few publications where the orientation of its work is described and the nexus between food, water and energy security is incidentally referred to.[48] Another observation is that the resilience concept is referred to in DRR policy, while in the climate change documents there is no reference to resilience. This suggests that in contrast to DFID, which has made efforts to introduce resilience as an overarching framework for different units (primarily Climate Change, Humanitarian Aid

[46]https://public.tableau.com/views/Climate-Related-Aid_new/Recipientperspective?:embed=y&:showTabs=y&:display_count=no?&:showVizHome=no#1. Accessed 23 February 2016.

[47]BMUB and BMZ (2015). *International Climate Finance: Germany's contribution*. Berlin/Bonn.

[48]BMZ (2015). *Climate action in practice: The contribution of German development policy*. Bonn/Berlin. p. 19.

and DRR), in GIZ there is as yet no such framework that could strengthen the integration of different policy areas.

However, two informants at GIZ reported that more recently, as a consequence of large-scale migration to Europe, there has been some discussion regarding the importance of working in a more integrated way with issues related to climate change, conflict prevention/resolution and migration in development programmes in partner countries.[49] It is important to emphasise that these discussions are very much in line with conflict research describing the indirect links between migration and violence (Van Baalen & Mobjörk 2016). Still, this debate is relatively recent within GIZ and it is difficult to say whether it will result in any concrete changes. However, there are some programmes in Bangladesh that address the linkages between climate change, conflict and migration.[50] This suggests that there is still room for improving GIZ's work in this regard by elaborating upon those links and concretising how they could be addressed systematically in strategies and programming. Nevertheless, integrating this issue requires it to be prioritised within the organisation. However, one informant suggested that while the large-scale migration has created momentum for addressing the links between climate change, conflict, and migration, not only in German national politics, but also within development cooperation, the topic still does not seem to have top priority within GIZ.[51] Hence, without a change of priorities at the top levels within BMZ and GIZ, the policies and directives are unlikely to change. The vulnerability assessments that are employed for climate mitigation and adaptation projects are considered next.

4.3.2 Vulnerability assessments

The equivalence to resilience methodologies within GIZ is the vulnerability assessments that are the standard procedure in GIZ climate change programming. Vulnerability assessments are conducted to identify climate change impacts and are intended to guide adaptation and development planning at different levels, as well as the monitoring and evaluation of those activities (BMZ 2014). In that sense, vulnerability assessments also contribute to evaluating a society's resilience to climate change. While socio-economic conditions (such as livelihoods, education, health, natural resource dependency) are taken into account, the indicators and guiding questions do not include references to conflict propensity (BMZ 2014:43).

[49]Interview with employee at the climate change department at GIZ, Germany, 9 February 2016. Interview with employee at GIZ, Germany, 23 March, 2016.
employees at GIZ (9 February & 23 March, 2016).
[50]Interview with employee at the climate change department at GIZ, Germany, 9 February 2016. Interview with employee at GIZ, Germany, 23 March, 2016.
[51]Interview with employee at GIZ, Germany, 23 March, 2016.

There are for instance no questions regarding the potential impacts of climate variability on migration patterns, which may lead to increased social tensions and in some cases conflict. As one informant argues:

> The [vulnerability] methodology stopped exactly at that part where we asked questions about socio-economic implications, but did not go further. On the other hand, if you go through the entire spectra of what we have had in German development aid on peace and conflict and impact assessment methodologies, those two don't go together.[52]

This quote suggests that there are good reasons for integrating the conflict dimension in vulnerability assessments. Other informants noted that another important implication of the lack of attention to conflict in vulnerability assessments is that it hampers prevention of conflict in countries that are currently not defined as 'conflict countries'. There are many countries that are heavily affected by climate change and at the same time suffer from fragile governance structures, low-intensity tensions and insecurities. As several informants suggested, it is precisely in these countries that it is most important to pay attention to how different impacts of climate change, such as unequal access to resources, migration and rapid urbanisation, could potentially reinforce existing tensions or create new tensions.[53] Unfortunately, as these countries are not defined as conflict countries, there is no assessment of the risks of conflicts arising. One way of dealing with this problem would be, as one informant suggests, to develop more consistent strategies, which unify climate vulnerability assessments and peace and conflict assessments.[54] However, as mentioned in the previous section, this would require high-level support within BMZ and GIZ.

4.3.3 Implementation level – ensuring conflict sensitivity in climate programming

As discussed above, when designing projects in conflict-affected states it is mandatory to address peace and conflict assessments in the programme proposal, reporting and auditing (BMZ 2013:20). Peace and conflict assessments are intended to offer support and ensure that projects are designed in a conflict-sensitive manner. This procedure follows similar logic as climate proofing, which is based on ensuring that the 'do no harm' principle is followed. More specifically, this means that climate change programmes should not have any negative impacts on conflict dynamics

[52] Interview with employee adelphi, Germany, 22 February, 2016.
[53] Interview with employee at CHASE, DFID, 2015. Interview with employee at the climate change department at GIZ, Germany, 19 February 2016.
[54] Interview with employee at adelphi, Germany, 22 February, 2016.

(BMZ et al. 2016). All development programming is expected to follow this principle, but only in conflict-affected countries is there comprehensive guidance, contextual analysis and follow-up mechanisms for ensuring that this is done properly.[55]

For programmes that do not have peace building as their primary goal, the requirements are less strict. For these projects, it is required that "conflict themes relevant to the project/programme" are included in the design of the project. It is also mandatory to "identify unintended impacts, conduct regular impact monitoring" (GTZ 2008:17). Two informants working with climate change adaptation suggested that due to lack of training in conflict analysis, but also to time constraints, it is difficult to carry out this work with appropriate quality and develop entirely conflict-sensitive projects.[56] As one of these informants stated, "it often difficult to integrate conflict-sensitivity as a red thread in the proposal, and in most cases only a few indicators are made conflict-sensitive, which become a bit scattered."[57] This quote clearly shows that given the work burden and different aspects that need to be considered in project and programme development, it is often challenging to give sufficient priority to all dimensions.

In sum, since the 1990s Germany has been at the forefront in the international debate on climate and security. However, as the present analysis demonstrated, this topic is primarily addressed in high-level policies, but has largely been dealt with through separate analytical tools for peace building and climate change programming. These separate tools still need to be improved in order to be able to better capture how complex risks interact with each other. Climate and conflict sensitivity proofing has to some extent contributed to integrate these perspectives. However, the minimum requirement of these procedures to 'do no harm' means that questions are not posed in a new way and programmes are not designed differently. The present analysis also showed that acute, short-term priorities often become prioritised at the cost of long-term goals. This means that the work with conflict prevention could become disregarded. As discussed above, organisational structures are likely to be an important obstacle, as it makes the coordination and integration between the units focused on climate change and those working on conflicts and security more challenging. Another important explanation is the lack of high-level support that is necessary if joint methodologies for conflict and climate vulnerability assessments are to be developed and implemented within the organisation.

[55]Interview with an employee at GIZ, Germany, 11 December, 2015.

[56]Interview with an employee at the Climate Change Department at GIZ, Germany, 9 February. Interview with an employee at the Climate Change Department at GIZ, Germany, 19 February.

[57]Interview with employee at the Climate Change Department at GIZ, Germany, 19 February, 2016.

5. The Netherlands – a newcomer within the climate security debate

"Climate change has a major impact on our security. We can no longer approach these two topics separately," said the Dutch foreign minister at the opening of the Planetary Security Conference.[58] In 2015, the Dutch MFA launched this annual conference, which was attended by high-level policy makers and experts. This was a way to show leadership and facilitate an international debate on the topic. The Dutch MFA has thus only very recently become engaged in the climate and security debate at international level. This engagement built upon that country's experience and strong expertise in water governance, as well as conflict management in international river basins. The Netherlands has thus experience of working with projects at the interface of conflict, natural resources and climate change. With this kind of niche expertise, it is particularly well suited to address water-related security risks that are likely to increase as a consequence of climate change and variability. The Netherlands is therefore an interesting case for analysis of a country trying to operationalise climate and security in its work.

The following sections first describe the Netherlands' niche expertise in water diplomacy and then present recent discussions within the ministry regarding how the links between climate and security could be operationalised. The reason for the briefer and more general description of the Netherlands in this report is that, in comparison with the two other cases, the recent discussions within the Dutch MFA have yet not been translated into policies, methodological tools and strategies.

[58]https://www.government.nl/topics/climate-change/news/2015/11/02/koenders-and-ploumen-'climate-change-and-security-are-intimately-linked', accessed 17 November 2015.

5.1 Water diplomacy – A Dutch climate and security niche?

The Dutch MFA, which is the unit responsible for development cooperation,[59] has a long trajectory of working with water governance and diplomacy. Water diplomacy is related to different attempts to prevent and resolve conflicts over water (in most cases transboundary freshwater resources such as lakes, rivers and aquifer basins). Genderen and Rood (2011:10) argue that these conflicts could be dealt with through different strategies such as negotiations, impartial fact finding, mediation and conciliation, or arbitration in cases where negotiation efforts have failed. They also highlight that besides groundwater and transboundary river governance, the Netherlands also has long experience of flood control and delta technology, as well as drinking water provision and sanitation. These challenges are most likely to increase as a consequence of climate change and also of increasing urbanisation. Given its expertise and established networks, the Netherlands can hence be considered particularly well-suited to take an internationally leading role in water conflict prevention and solution (Genderen & Rood 2011:2).

Currently, the Dutch MFA implements three types of water programmes with components of climate change adaptation and conflict prevention or resolution. The first type is the bilateral water programme in fragile states and post-conflict societies (Palestinian Territories, Yemen, Mali, Rwanda, South Sudan). An employee at the Dutch MFA, notes that in these contexts it can be very difficult to address long-term climate risks, since there is not enough solid information regarding the more specific impacts of climate change on water and food resources. Moreover, in addition to the lack of knowledge of future climate impacts, the informant argues that in many cases short-term needs are so pressing that they need to be prioritised.[60]

The second type is water programmes in international river basins such as the Senegal River, Niger and Lake Chad. Another informant at the Dutch MFA, explains that in these areas there is increasing foreign investment in agriculture and large-scale dams, which have the potential to contribute to local conflicts with regional spill-over effects. The same informant also reported that the Dutch programmes are intended to identify negative impacts and prevent conflicts that could easily arise due to unequal access to

[59]The Dutch MFA has two ministers: the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. The fact that trade issues are in the same portfolio is important for understanding how the climate and security issue is addressed.

[60]Interview (no.2) with employee at the MFA, the Netherlands, 18 January 2016. See also interview (no.1) with another employee at the MFA, the Netherlands, 18 January 2016, for a similar argument.

water resources. He also pointed out that the Dutch programmes have a substantial component of adaptation as well as conflict prevention.[61]

The third type is water-related investments in countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, Myanmar, Indonesia, Mozambique) in low-lying, densely populated deltas where increasing water security risks as a result of climate change are a major driver. One informant argues that even though these countries are currently not defined as fragile or conflict-affected, there is an imminent risk of them becoming destabilised if large groups of people fail to adapt in time.[62] Hence, even though not labelled as such, these programmes could help to reduce forced migration and thus have positive impacts on livelihood security.

In sum, the Dutch water programmes are designed to address water scarcity or abundances in relation to conflicts in transboundary river basins. These programmes are likely to become even more important as problems surrounding water governance become intensified as a consequence of climate change and variability. Currently, the programmes are focused on water governance problems in the short term, while there is little focus on long-term climate change. Even though the programmes are not labelled as such and the climate dimension could be strengthened, they still seem to be relatively close to addressing compound risks at the interface of conflict and climate. Hence, opportunities and challenges for further integrating these risks in strategies and programming are being identified in on-going discussions at the MFA.

5.2 Reflections on how to implement climate-security policies

In the aftermath of the Planetary Security conference in November 2015, there has been a discussion within the Dutch MFA regarding how to operationalise the link between climate change and security in development cooperation. This initiative seems to be driven by some individuals convinced of the importance of operationalizing the link, while others are more sceptical of the importance for the Dutch MFA to prioritize this.

Within the Dutch MFA, the Department for Inclusive Green Growth is responsible for climate change programming. Many water programmes are also run by this department, which implies that there is both a climate and a conflict perspective within the group. In a similar way as in DFID and GIZ,

[61] Interview (no.1) with employee at MFA, the Netherlands, 18 January, 2016.
[62] Interview (no.1) with employee at the MFA, the Netherlands, 18 January, 2016.

a separate department is responsible for programmes related to more large-scale conflicts.

When the informants were asked about how they envision the implementation of climate and security within development programmes, it was clear that the lack of clarity and organisational values affected their interpretations of how climate and security could be implemented. Some informants argued that the climate and security debate is too abstract and that it is important to concretise what it actually means and create guidelines for how staff members should work with these issues.[63] The lack of clarity in the debate also meant that organisational values and traditionally strong focus on water shaped how the operationalisation of the debate was envisioned. From the point of view of various informants, climate risks are largely related to water scarcity and abundance. Hence, some informants suggested that many of the water-related projects could be relabelled climate and security projects. Some informants said that there is a lack of information on the long-term climate impacts on food and water resources, which makes it difficult to design interventions for addressing those changes. Others argued that climate impacts are only one factor among several, and in some contexts not even the most important factor.[64] These reflections show how informants are trying to deal with the still relatively unclear priorities regarding the issue by fitting it into the 'normal' ways of doing things. This opens up for the risk that the climate and security discourse is adopted without any substantive changes of the way they work.

However, some informants within the MFA pointed out the importance of increased interdepartmental coordination for working in a more integrated manner. For instance, the Netherlands has a tradition of cross-ministerial coordination of activities related to international water. This coordination involves the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Infrastructure and Environment. Similar efforts have been made with climate change. The Inclusive Green Growth department consists of four "clusters": water, food security, energy and climate. The climate cluster involves four ministries (Finance, Environment, Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs). One informant at the Inclusive Green Growth department at the MFA, noted that the advantages with these clusters is that they force the ministries to get out of their silos and identify common grounds that contribute to more coherent national policies. The informant added that even though there are disadvantages, such as the time required for building relationships with different ministries, the "positive lesson learned is that a lot of in-fighting between the ministries disappears." In the informant's view, interdepartmental coordination is a more efficient strategy than mainstreaming. As he puts it: "We have climate

[63]Interview (no.2) with employee at the MFA, the Netherlands, 18 January 2016.
[64]Interview (no.1) with employee at the MFA, the Netherlands, 18 January, 2016.

mainstreaming, but that doesn't do the trick. That's just not enough, usually mainstreaming buries an issue".[65] While the previous analysis of DFID and GIZ demonstrated that mainstreaming is certainly not sufficient to fully integrate an issue, it also showed that the mainstreaming approach could raise awareness of an issue.

However, it is important to acknowledge that the water and climate clusters do not necessarily address combined conflict and climate risks. According to an employee at the Dutch MFA, the climate cluster focuses more on climate negotiations, while the water cluster does not have a strong focus on climate.[66] Hence, neither cluster has a focus on climate security risks. In the informant's view, there is a tendency to work in silos regarding those issues and it is important to strengthen horizontal linkages between different policy areas. In this context, one could speculate if the creation of a cluster for climate security would be a viable strategy for strengthening horizontal linkages.

In sum, even though the Netherlands engaged in the international debate on climate and security relatively recently, that country's long tradition of working with water diplomacy is likely to affect how the Dutch MFA operationalises the climate and security link in development cooperation. However, these are not labelled as climate security projects and they do not take long-term impacts of climate change and variability into account.[67] Factors that may have important implications for the possibility to translate high-level political statements into policies, strategies and programming are political prioritisations, but also the current budget constraints. However, the above analysis also indicates that if climate and security were to be prioritised within MFA, the Netherlands would have a unique niche within the area of water-related conflict prevention and resolution, which would easily fit into the climate and security debate.

[65] Interview (no.3) with employee at the MFA, the Netherlands, 18 January 2016.
[66] Interview (no.2) with employee at the MFA, the Netherlands, 19 January, 2016.
[67] Interview (no.1) with employee at the MFA, the Netherlands, 18 January, 2016.

6. Experiences and implications for policy

This study examined how three development organisations address combined climate and conflict risks in their policies. It also investigated how the organisations deal with challenges to implementing these policies in their programmes. For DFID and GIZ, the level of integration was examined at three levels: high-level thematic policies, analytical tools and regional strategies, and the implementation level. The Dutch MFA was assessed more briefly, as its recent high-level initiative are more recent in comparison to Germany and UK. This final section first compares how climate risks have been integrated at different levels in peace-building efforts in DFID and GIZ, and then how conflict considerations have been integrated in climate change programming in these organisations. It then moves on to discuss some more general factors that could hamper effective integration of climate and conflict risks, and that may be important explanations for the opportunities and constraints in translating policies into analytical tools, strategies and programming.

6.1 Climate-resilient peace building

Climate-resilient peace building means that short- and long-term climate risks are taken into consideration in peace-building efforts as potential drivers of conflict (Crawford et. al. 2015:1). This study analysed how climate risks have been integrated at different levels in the three development organisations analysed, with particular emphasis on factors that could hamper integration. In high-level policies in both DFID and GIZ, climate change is mentioned as a factor that could increase the potential for conflicts. The British BSO strategy (2001:10) states that "climate change could increase the potential for conflict over disputed land and water", while the German peace and security strategy suggests that climate change may "trigger and perpetuate fragility and violence" (2013:12). It is therefore striking that neither organisation has adopted requirements on addressing climate change and variability in conflict analysis. The purpose of conflict analysis is to identify the changes needed to prevent and/or overcome conflicts. In some cases, staff members at the two organisations have on their own initiative included climate risks in the analysis. This was for instance the case in the JACS for the Sahel region, where the team responsible decided to include climate risks. In a similar way as with conflict

analysis, there are no formal requirements in DFID's operational plans to take climate risks into account as a potential trigger of conflicts. Climate risks are still sometimes included, but at the initiative of individual staff members.

Without mandatory requirements, it is very much up to the commitment and capability of the staff members responsible for reports and there is an obvious risk that only the most obvious and well-known links will be identified. An important limitation in this context is that there are few staff members with competence in combined climate and conflict risks in peace and conflict units.

Regarding the mandatory procedures at implementation level, DFID and GIZ have had very similar systems of climate proofing, but DFID opted to withdraw its system in 2014 due to the time and resources required to implement it properly. In both organisations, climate proofing has helped raise the awareness of climate change within peace and conflict departments. However, DFID's follow-up mechanisms seem to be somewhat less rigorous that those applied by GIZ. An important limitation with how climate-proofing strategies are designed in both organisations is that they only ensure that the 'do no harm' principle is followed. There is no requirement for peace-building programmes to be modified so that they contribute in a positive way to combined climate and conflict risks. This suggests that in order to achieve more substantive changes, it is therefore necessary to introduce new mandatory considerations, including positive contributions.

Summing up, in both DFID and GIZ, climate risks have primarily been integrated in high-level policies and through climate proofing. While climate proofing has the advantage of raising awareness of the topic, in order to integrate climate risks more fully the analysis suggests it needs to be complemented with other strategies. This study showed that it is important to include new indicators in analytical tools and country strategies, for instance.

6.2 Conflict-sensitive climate change programming

Conflict-sensitive climate change programming means that responses to climate change should not increase the risk of conflict and in the best case even help strengthen peace-building processes (Crawford et. al. 2015:1). Thus it is interesting to consider how well conflict risks and sensitivity have been integrated in policies, analytical tools and implementation in the two organisations.

In high-level policies, DFID has largely addressed climate change in terms of resilience. Under this framework, DFID has formulated policies to

integrate climate change with closely related thematic areas such as humanitarian aid and poverty reduction, but also with peace-building efforts. DFID has thus sought to develop a joint overarching framework for integrating different policy areas. In Germany, it is primarily the DRR policy that identifies the link between climate change, disaster and violent conflicts, while in the documents on climate change mitigation and adaptation no such link is recognised. Informants within GIZ suggest that the large-scale migration into Europe has initiated a discussion about how issues related to climate change, conflict prevention/resolution and migration could be linked in development cooperation. An explanatory factor in this case is the internal organisational structures; in GIZ, DRR is located in the same unit as peace-building programmes, while climate change adaptation and mitigation programmes are located in a separate unit.

At the level of analytical tools, DFID employs resilience methodology, while GIZ uses vulnerability assessments. Both methodologies aim to identify risks and strengthen adaptation and development planning. They also address socio-economic conditions. However, it seems like the resilience methodology employed by DFID to larger extent includes conflict propensity, compared to the vulnerability assessments employed by GIZ.

At the level of implementation, both DFID and GIZ have guidelines for conflict-affected and fragile states regarding how to ensure the conflict sensitivity of development programming. These strategies and guidelines could be seen as a way of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity. However, informants suggested that without a help desk and other types of support, it could be very challenging to employ these tools and develop entirely conflict-sensitive projects. Moreover, these procedures follow a similar logic as climate proofing, which means that the minimum requirement is to 'do no harm'. An important implication of this is that these procedures in themselves are unlikely to strengthen peace-building processes. Overall, then, our analysis suggests that mainstreaming strategies are not enough for effectively addressing combined climate and conflict risks.

An important consequence of the separate methodologies for conflict and climate vulnerability is the risk that countries heavily affected by climate change and variability, but not defined as conflict-affected or fragile, could become destabilised as a consequence of failed adaptation efforts, migration and increased resource scarcity. For these countries, it is particularly important to include the conflict dimension in vulnerability and resilience assessments, in order to work in a more preventative manner as regards social tensions that could potentially arise.

Summing up, while DFID has included the conflict dimension in high-level resilience policies, there is no reference to conflict in GIZ climate change

documents. The conflict dimension is also not present in vulnerability assessments, although there are some minimum procedures in order to ensure that projects are conflict-sensitive. While these procedures are important, there are various ways in which guidelines and support of staff members could be further improved. However, to ensure that climate change programming is conflict sensitive in a broader sense, it is also necessary to identify ways in which these projects should not only 'do no harm'. but also contribute to peace in a more positive sense.

6.3 Factors important for policy implementation

It is clear that while there are some high-level policies regarding the links between climate change and security, these links are yet not integrated systematically in analytical tools and implementation procedures. This section focuses on the most important factors that pose a problem to effective integration of climate and conflict risks and present some strategies for dealing with these factors.

6.3.1 Unclear policy objectives and lack of information

This study found that an important explanation for the disconnection between high-level policies and their implementation is the lack of clarity and operationalisation of these policies into concrete guidelines that support staff members in their daily work. Climate and security has in many cases been used as a powerful discourse for persuading conservatives to increase their support for climate negotiations, so it is important to consider why policies have not been operationalised. Although full assessment of this issue was outside the scope of the present study, lack of political leadership and lack of information seem to be two important explanations. If there is no sustained and coherent political leadership that operationalises this discourse into more concrete goals, staff members overloaded with the requirements of different policies and priorities are unlikely to change their normal procedures for doing things.

Another important explanation is most likely as claimed by Lewis and Lenton (2015:384) that the lack of information on concrete impacts of climate change prevents policy makers from responding to climate risks. While climate variability affects societies today, it is difficult to specify the impacts of climate change that will take place in 30 or 40 years. Even if this information were available, for development organisations that operate in areas where acute problems often require immediate responses, it could be difficult to prioritise potential future problems.

Solutions to these problems

Even if it is difficult to get information about exact climate impacts, it is still possible, based on the available information, to include this dimension in existing methodologies and planning processes. However, this requires political leadership and resources and the processes themselves require expertise that is often lacking in development organisations. For instance, it is important to include climate advisors in different kinds of processes and train staff members. External help desks or public policy consultancies could undoubtedly also play an important role in providing expertise and support.

6.3.2 Internal organisational structures

Besides the difficulties posed by unclear policy objectives and lack of information, there are obstacles posed by siloed organisational structures. Effectively responding to climate-induced security challenges requires coordination and information from largely separate policy areas. These actors have their own organisational structures and cultures, which affects how they interpret and implement policy. One example of organisations trying to make new policies to fit into their normal way of doing things was provided by some informants at the Dutch MFA, who argued that their water diplomacy programmes are already designed to address this problem and it is therefore a matter of relabeling, rather than requiring a substantive change in orientation in their work. Even though, this might be a reasonable assessment, it also illustrates how policy communities often seek to implement policies in a way that is consistent with their thematic focus. As a consequence, the initial intention of policy may be lost in the implementation process. For instance, if one department is responsible for implementation, there is a risk that it will interpret the policy from its own perspective and try to fit it in into its 'normal way of doing things'. As suggested by Crawford et al. (2015:7), it could therefore be important to create new forms of coordination between policy areas for sharing knowledge, developing joint risk analysis and coordinating actions. However, even when new institutional structures for coordination between policy communities are created, it is important to reflect upon the perspectives represented. In the UK, the Stabilisation Unit was created to coordinate development, foreign policy and defence analysis and programming. However, as only conflict advisors were included, the Unit continued to focus on large-scale political conflicts with a short-term time horizon, and hence overlooked low-scale conflicts, which are the main type of conflict associated with climate change and variability. This suggests that even though organisational coordination and structures are important, it is also important to include staff with expertise on combined climate and conflict risks.

Solutions to these problems
Coordination could be strengthened by the creation of steering groups or by delegating the responsibility to a public policy consultancy. Steering groups can be time consuming, but are also important for identifying common grounds between different policy communities, which is often necessary in implementing policies that transcend policy areas. Partly delegate the coordinating role to a public policy consultancy could provide expertise and human resources, and thereby contribute to addressing issues in more coherent and sustained manner.

6.3.3 Measures for support and control

A third important explanation is the level of support and administrative control of staff members. It emerged from the analysis that staff members need to be supported in their work and that effective mechanisms for follow-up and monitoring of results need to be put in place to ensure compliance. It is primarily in relation to mainstreaming strategies that concrete forms of support and administrative control currently exist. In GIZ, climate proofing has been a high-profile theme and significantly more resources have been invested in making these procedures work compared with conflict proofing. For instance, there are accessible help desks, internal campaigns and follow-up procedures for ensuring climate proofing. Staff members reported great pressure to implement climate-proofing procedures, but also that they received good support. Until 2014, DFID had a similar system, with a special unit of climate and environmental advisors who revised and approved each project. However, in that case the follow-up procedures seem to have been less rigorous, so even though climate risks were identified in many projects, this did not result in any change of project to address this risk.

Solutions to these problems
First, it is important that heads of divisions ensure that staff members have the necessary capabilities and that they are committed to implementing the policy. Staff members' capabilities and commitments could be enhanced by training courses and internal campaigns in which the relevance for each team is explained. However, it must also be acknowledged that assessments of climate or conflict risks could be difficult to perform and there may be a need for specialist expert units that could offer support in project development and monitor projects. Finally, it is also important to strengthen effective follow-up procedures. If climate risks have been identified in a project, it is important to ensure that measures are taken to adapt that project accordingly.

6.4 Conclusions

The three organisations analysed in this study (DFID, GIZ and Dutch MFA) have mixed records of integrating climate and conflict risks in their work. While policies are often formulated at a relatively abstract level, they still need to be implemented in a more systematic fashion within the organisations. A number of obstacles that hamper effective implementation of these policies on climate and conflict risks were identified here. The majority of these related to internal organisation and procedures, and included lack of coordination between different policy areas, lack of support for staff through providing help desks or expert groups, and lack of effective follow-up mechanisms. Some more general obstacles were also identified, the most important being lack of information on climate impacts on for instance water, food and disaster risks, which makes it more difficult for policy makers to respond effectively.

However, this is a relatively new field and the three organisations studied are still in the process of developing and assessing the value of different methodologies and strategies. Even though they have not advanced far in all regards, there are important lessons to be learnt from their experiences that can be of benefit to Swedish practitioners and policy makers.

6.5 Lessons for policy-makers and practitioners

Translation of high-level policies into strategies and programming has proven to be a challenge for development organisations. Lack of knowledge and internal organisational structures and priorities are important obstacles for effective implementation. An important question is therefore how the implementation could be further improved. A number of lessons for policy-makers and practitioners are outlined below.

Improve coordination across policy areas
Climate and security threats span different policy areas that are often strongly separated. If these policy areas are managed within the same department or if a new steering group is created for dealing with climate and security issues, coordination is significantly easier. For instance, the Dutch MFA has positive experiences of working with interdepartmental groups related to water diplomacy. External expert units could also play an important coordinating role and contribute to coherence and sustainability over time.

The importance of knowledge
In responding to climate-induced security risks, information about how climate change may affect food, water, migration and humanitarian disasters

is crucial. Development organisations often lack the knowledge for responding efficiently to combined climate and conflict risks, so it is important to create help desks or units, internal or external, providing expertise on these matters. It is also important to ensure that staff members with competence in climate and conflict risks are represented in conflict analysis and that conflict advisors are included in resilience assessments. Finally, at international level, the possibility to share information on climate impacts among donor organisations should be considered.

Improve methodological tools
Various studies have indicated a need to assess compound risks. There is still a tendency, both within DFID and GIZ, that climate programming and peace-building efforts are mainly dealt with using separate analytical tools that makes it more difficult to capture how complex risks interact with each other. It is therefore important to develop new analytical tools that address both conflict risks and climate change vulnerability. To avoid reinventing the wheel in this regard, it is important to review the methods that exist today or are currently under development.

Limitations of mainstreaming strategies
Mainstreaming strategies have the advantage of raising awareness of an issue, but mainstreaming requires time, capabilities and commitment by staff members. It is therefore important to set up help desks or expert units that provide staff members with support, particularly during programme development and, if necessary, assume a monitoring role during the life cycle of the project. Note, however, that climate risks are not relevant in all kinds of projects, which was a major reason why DFID decided to retract mandatory climate proofing in its programmes. The importance of the initial phase still needs to be emphasized; if climate risks are not considered properly then, the subsequent steps will certainly be affected.

A general limitation of mainstreaming strategies is that they follow the 'do no harm' logic of only ensuring that projects have no obvious negative impacts, for instance on climate change. However, mainstreaming does not necessarily lead to more profound forms of integration, where positive effects are achieved. Hence, mainstreaming strategies alone are not sufficient to effectively address combined climate and conflict risks and need to be complemented with other integration strategies.

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List of interviews

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2) Group interview with a cross-government team involved in the JACS, UK, 7 January 2016.
3) Interview with employee at the climate change department at GIZ, Germany, 9 February 2016.
4) Interview with former employee at UNEP staff member working within a DFID-funded project in Sudan, 26 January 2016.
5) Interview with employee at adelphi, Germany, 22 February, 2016.
6) Interview with employee at the Profession of Environment and Climate change at DFID, UK, 6 January 2016.
7) Interview with an employee at GIZ, Germany, 23 March 2016.
8) Interview (no.1) with employee at the MFA, the Netherlands, 18 January 2016.
9) Interview (no.2) with employee at the MFA, the Netherlands, 18 January 2016.
10) Interview with employee at CHASE, DFID, UK, 23 December 2016.
11) Interview with former government official, UK, 21 January 2016.
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