# DRIVERS OF INEQUALITY— TECHNOLOGY, SKILLS, AND INSTITUTIONS DISCUSSION OF ACEMOGLU AND VIOLANTE

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## DISCUSSION ROADMAP

- 1. Very brief overview of the two presentations
- 2. Inequality within groups
- 3. Inequality in more dimensions
- 4. Aggregate implications of inequality

Since I only have  $\sim 14$  minutes left: Focus on high level comments

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("K"rusell, "O"hanian, "R"ios-Rull, and) "V"iolante: Capital-skill complementarity



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- ► Some explanations: changes in worker sorting, firm heterogeneity, occupational mobility, returns to experience, demographics

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- ► Tax and transfer systems (and changes over time), also important for inequality in consumption, income, and wealth (more on this tomorrow)

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  - ► Different propensities to save/consume
- ► Inequality can lead to *amplification* of shocks (and inequality itself)
- ► Virtually every shock and policy change or action involves redistribution across households

## INEQUALITY IN MACROECONOMICS

- ▶ Historically, heterogeneity and inequality was absent in macroeconomics (or was assumed to have no effect because of complete markets)
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## INEQUALITY IN MACROECONOMICS

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- ▶ In stark constrast to evidence that households fail to perfectly smooth consumption (e.g. Hall 1978, Cochrane 1991, Attanasio and Davis 1996)
- ▶ Bewley-Imrohorogu-Huggett-Aiyagari laid the ground work for quantitative macro based on household heterogeneity and incomplete markets
- ► Input to those models: income risk, typically equated to residual income inequality
- ► Aggregates have to be consistent with market interactions of agents subject to idiosyncratic risk
- ► Focus was typically on longer-run questions, tax reforms, etc

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- ► Analysis disciplined by new evidence on:
  - ► Marginal propensities to consume (e.g. work by Johnson, Parker, Souleles)
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  - ▶ Unequal incidence of policy across the distribution (e.g. Holm et al, Broer et al)
- ▶ Not just micro-foundations, but micro-consistent models that take seriously the two-way feedback between inequality and the macroeconomy