Research project How does the tax and benefit structure of the welfare state shape popular support for redistribution
Why is it more likely that people support redistribution in some countries than in others? This question has been studied extensively because a broad support for redistribution to a large extent explains governments’ welfare state efforts.
In the context of growing income inequality and challenges to welfare state legitimacy, research on redistribution preference deserves continued attention. Two main institutional accounts can be said to compete. Although both agree that a universalist welfare state is conducive to broad support of redistribution, they focus on different sides of universalism: Is it universal benefits to all that makes people support redistribution (Korpi & Palme 1998)? Or is it universal tax contributions by all (Rothstein 1998)? It remains unclear which account is most plausible and to what extent they explain the support for redistribution.
Empirical support is not established for either account. It is also unclear how taxes and benefits interact in shaping support for redistribution. Previous measures of universalism (overall dispersion of taxes and benefits) neither take the level of benefits/taxes (10 or 30 percent of income) nor how the levels vary across income groups (low, middle and high) into account. With refined measures, I estimate the effects of institutional designs on individual redistribution preferences. I hypothesize that a high tax rate on low incomes makes middle- and high-income groups consent to redistribution (and even to higher taxes for them). And it also facilitates ‘ownership’ of the welfare state among low-income individuals, leading to a more informed preference. High benefits to the middle class make them support redistribution. For 16 rich democracies, I use multi-level models for estimation, drawing on data from Luxembourg Income Study and International Social Survey Programme.
Project members
Project managers
Younghwan Byun
Research fellow
