Abstract

Early Stoics subscribed to a version of the idea that it is on account of being a practitioner of a form of expertise concerned with the whole of human life that the wise can do well in all relevant respects. Furthermore, they conceived of this higher-order form of expertise as structurally analogous but epistemically superior to first-order forms of expertise. One corollary of the Stoic view is that, for any given first-order form of expertise, only the wise person can be a genuine expert. Indeed, there is evidence for the claim that at least some forms of expertise practiced by the wise are transformed into quasi-virtuous states of the soul.

In this paper, I discuss three potential connections a Stoic might draw between first-order forms of expertise and the expertise concerned with the whole of human life. First, insofar as all forms of expertise involve knowledge-that and knowledge-how, the expertise in living well must involve actionable mastery of Stoic doctrine. Second, since virtue is a matter of dealing with indifferents, and forms of expertise are specialized forms of dealing with indifferents, the practice of the expertise in living well must involve some first-order forms of expertise. Third, the motivation and justification for acting on the demands of a specialized expertise ultimately derive from the judgement of the expertise in living well concerning the all-things-considered action to be done, calling into question the epistemic autonomy of first-order forms of expertise.